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RAPE BEYOND CRIME 
MARGO KAPLAN† 
ABSTRACT 
  Public health experts agree that sexual violence constitutes a 
significant public health issue. Yet criminal law dominates rape law 
almost completely, with public health law playing at best a small 
supporting role. Recent civil law developments, such as university 
disciplinary proceedings, similarly fixate on how best to find and 
penalize perpetrators. As a result, rape law continues to spin its wheels 
in the same arguments and obstacles. 
  This Article argues that, without broader cultural changes, criminal 
law faces a double bind: rape laws will either be ineffective or neglect 
the importance of individual culpability. Public health law provides 
more promising terrain for rape prevention because it is a strong legal 
framework that can engage the complex causes of rape, including the 
social norms that promote sexual aggression. While criminal law can 
only punish bad behavior, public health interventions can use the more 
effective prevention strategy of promoting positive behaviors and 
relationships. They can also address the myriad sexual behaviors and 
social determinants that increase the risk of rape but are outside the 
scope of criminal law. Perhaps most importantly, public health law 
relies on evidence-based interventions and the expertise of public health 
authorities to ensure that laws and policies are effective. 
  Transforming rape law in this way provides a framework for legal 
feminism to undertake the unmet challenge of “theorizing yes,” that is, 
moving beyond how to protect women’s right to refuse sex and toward 
promoting and exploring positive models of sex. Criminal law is simply 
incapable of meeting this challenge because it concerns only what sex 
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should not be. A public health framework can give the law a richer role 
in addressing the full spectrum of sexual attitudes and behaviors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Rape poses a special problem for the law. Legal scholars and 
lawmakers agree that rape is a horrific crime and that traditional rape 
law was underinclusive and unfair to victims.1 Yet there is little 
 
 1. See infra Part I.A. “Rape” and “sexual assault” are legal terms, referring to criminal 
offenses defined in statutes. Use of these terms can vary based on jurisdiction. Compare N.Y. 
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consensus on how best to reform rape law, and efforts have yielded 
disappointing results.2 Forced or coerced sex remains widespread and 
difficult to prosecute, particularly when the victim knows the 
defendant.3 
This meager progress is unsurprising: legal scholars have 
undertaken a task destined to fail. We have made rape law almost 
exclusively the provenance of criminal law, a framework of prohibition 
and punishment. Criminal law is inherently ill suited to meet the 
challenges rape poses, most notably rape’s entrenchment in a culture 
that views sex as antagonistic—something to be taken or won from a 
partner. 
This Article argues that, absent a broader change in this culture, 
criminal law faces a double bind: rape laws will be either ineffective or 
unjust. The facts of any given rape case must be interpreted by judges 
and jurors steeped in a culture of gender stereotypes and rape myths. 
Yet rape law cannot avoid this problem by forcing prosecutors, juries, 
and judges to ignore these social norms. Even the most despicable 
beliefs can be relevant to determining a defendant’s mens rea—
whether the defendant knew the victim did not consent or was reckless 
or negligent as to the victim’s nonconsent.4 The problem is not merely 
that social norms thwart effective prosecution; if we truly care about 
culpability, sometimes they must, because social and cultural norms are 
integral to a defendant’s mens rea. Social norms and cultural cognition 
 
PENAL LAW § 130.35 (McKinney 2009) (using the term “rape”), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 
(West 2016) (using the term “sexual assault”). The terms may also be used to refer to something 
broader than what the law prohibits—a normative conception of what ought to be punishable.  
 This Article uses both “sexual assault” and “rape.” It uses both the descriptive and 
normative meanings of the terms in different contexts; it analyzes both the criminal law’s difficulty 
enforcing laws that define rape in a particular jurisdiction, while also discussing rape law in a 
normative sense. Furthermore, the Article uses terms such as “sexual aggression,” “sexual 
violence,” and “unwanted sex” to acknowledge that the concept of rape occurs within a larger 
context of issues related to sex, aggression, and consent that may be broader than the legal 
definition of rape. 
 2. See infra Part I.A. 
 3. See Katharine K. Baker, Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime, 100 MINN. L. REV. 
221, 235–36 (2015); David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1251–52 (1997); David Lisak & Paul M. Miller, Repeat Rape and 
Multiple Offending Among Undetected Rapists, 17 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 73, 73 (2002); Cassia 
Spohn & David Holleran, Prosecuting Sexual Assault: A Comparison of Charging Decisions in 
Sexual Assault Cases Involving Strangers, Acquaintances, and Intimate Partners, 18 JUST. Q. 651, 
682 (2001); see also SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL 351–52 (1975) (stating that 
police are more likely to consider stranger rapes founded than acquaintance rapes). For statistics 
on the prevalence of forced sex, see infra notes 66–78. 
 4. See infra Part I.B.2. 
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can therefore render toothless even the most progressive criminal law 
rape reforms.5 Rape law reform is bound to fail unless it directly 
addresses the culture that accepts and promotes sexual aggression. 
The answer is not to scale back the law’s approach to rape, but 
rather to change its dimensions. This Article proposes that we 
reconceptualize rape law as public health law, with criminal law serving 
a complementary role. Public health experts agree that sexual violence 
constitutes a significant public health issue.6 Yet, among legal scholars 
and lawmakers, criminal law dominates rape law almost completely, 
with public health law playing at best a small supporting role. This 
Article inverts that dynamic. 
A public health framework is far better suited than criminal law 
to address the complex factors that encourage sexual violence and 
coercion. Public health law’s focus is evidence-based prevention. While 
criminal law determines whether bad behavior should be punished, 
public health strategies focus on identifying and establishing healthful 
behavior among communities and populations. It is broad in scope, 
integrating several areas of law from education law to environmental 
law. Indeed, public health law encompasses any area of law that seeks 
to improve the health and well-being of the population.7 
Public health law provides a strong legal framework to analyze 
and engage the complex causes of rape. In particular, public health law 
can change the social norms that promote sexual violence and thwart 
its successful prosecution. Changing the paradigm of rape law can help 
meet the challenge posed by Katherine Franke’s seminal work 
Theorizing Yes.8 As Franke notes, feminist legal scholarship has 
 
 5. See infra Part I.B.1. 
 6. See infra Part II.A. 
 7. While public health law was traditionally limited to issues such as disease control and 
quarantine, it has expanded significantly in recent years. Public health laws and policies are those 
that promote the well-being of populations and communities. They can encompass laws and 
policies as diverse as school curricula promoting condom use, the monitoring of racial disparities 
in health outcomes, and the regulation of the insurance market. See infra Part II.A. The concept 
of health itself is no longer limited to the absence of disease, but encompasses “a state of complete 
physical, mental, and social well-being and not just the absence of sickness or frailty.” CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH: DEFINITIONS, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/socialdeterminants/definitions.html [https://perma.cc/24FK-C2PU]; 
WHO Definition of Health, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/about/definition/en/
print.html [https://perma.cc/62YL-6RJB]; see infra Part II.A.  
 8. See generally Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and 
Desire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2001) (moving feminist legal theory in a direction to explore 
and protect sexual pleasure by allowing women to say “yes” instead of protecting women through 
the right to say “no”).  
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stressed protection from sex through prohibition, championing 
women’s right to say “no.”9 Yet it has failed to thoroughly explore what 
it might mean to say “yes,” what can be good and right about sex, and 
whether the law can and should further protect sexual pleasure.10 
Criminal law is simply incapable of meeting this challenge because it 
concerns only what sex should not be. In contrast, a public health 
framework can explore positive models of sex. It can also give the law 
a richer role in addressing the full spectrum of sexual attitudes and 
behaviors, including those that should not be criminal but nonetheless 
contribute to sexual aggression. 
The unwarranted assumption that rape law should be primarily 
criminal law has thus far dominated legal scholarship.11 Under this 
assumption, scholars have debated how to define the harm of rape;12 
the meaning and role of force and consent in creating an actus reus (the 
conduct requirement of an offense);13 the role of culpability and how 
 
 9. See id. at 197–98. 
 10. See id. at 182, 198–201. 
 11. See Baker, supra note 3, at 221 (noting that scholars, lawmakers, and advocates have 
converged on criminal law to address rape, but suggesting this may change in the context of 
campus rape); Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 582–
85 (2009) (discussing feminism’s focus on the criminalization of rape).  
 12. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX 99–112 (1998) (arguing that rape 
infringes on sexual autonomy); ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL RELATIONS 89–118 
(2003) (analyzing the unique harm of rape); Michelle J. Anderson, All American Rape, 79 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 625, 634–43 (2005) (discussing different views of the harm of rape); Michal 
Buchhandler-Raphael, The Failure of Consent: Re-Conceptualizing Rape as Sexual Abuse of 
Power, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 147, 199–215 (2011) (arguing that rape is sexual abuse of power); 
Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1148–49 (1986) (considering the unique indignity and 
harm of rape); Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual 
Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1425–27 (2013) (arguing that rape is a violation of the right to 
self-possession); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Rape On and Off Campus, 65 EMORY L.J. 1, 40–45 
(2015) (arguing that rape is a violation of sexual agency).  
 13. See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 17–45, 254–82 (discussing force and consent in 
rape law); WERTHEIMER, supra note 12, at 119–43 (analyzing the concept of consent to sex); 
Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1407–27 (2005) (analyzing the 
shortcomings of consent and proposing an alternative model); Baker, supra note 3, at 226–35 
(discussing force and consent in rape law); Craig T. Byrnes, Putting the Focus Where It Belongs: 
Mens Rea, Consent, Force, and the Crime of Rape, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 277, 286–94 (1998) 
(same); Joshua Dressler, Where We Have Been and Where We Might Be Going: Some Cautionary 
Reflections on Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 409, 415–30 (1998) (analyzing different 
conceptions of force and consent in rape law); Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the 
Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 
1793, 1804 (1992) (arguing that rape law should eliminate the conjunction between force and 
consent and proposing a commodity theory of sex); Estrich, supra note 12, at 1105–32, 1178–84 
(analyzing force and consent in rape law); Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 6–39 (same). 
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to define mens rea (the mental state requirement of an offense);14 and 
the balancing of effective prosecution with defendants’ rights.15 Legal 
feminism has similarly adopted the language of criminal law as the 
primary—if not sole—means of discussing rape.16 
While some legal scholarship has noted the shortcomings of the 
criminal law framework, these works have failed to offer a compelling 
alternative.17 The rare proposed alternatives focus on additional 
 
 14. See, e.g., SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 90–100 (1987) (proposing a negligence standard); 
SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 258–60 (discussing problems in defining the mens rea of rape); 
Byrnes, supra note 13, at 293–99 (proposing a “negligence toward the will” standard); Dressler, 
supra note 13, at 430–40 (expressing concerns about the erosion of the mens rea requirement); 
Estrich, supra note 12, at 1096–105, 1178–84 (discussing rape law’s approach to mens rea and 
proposing a negligence standard). See generally Robin Charlow, Bad Acts in Search of a Mens 
Rea: Anatomy of a Rape, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 263 (discussing problems in defining the mens rea 
of rape). 
 15. See generally Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: 
Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51 (2002) (analyzing rape 
shield laws and their exceptions); Katharine K. Baker, Once a Rapist? Motivational Evidence and 
Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1997) (same); Richard I. Haddad, Note, Shield 
or Sieve? People v. Bryant and Rape Shield Laws in High-Profile Cases, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 185 (2005) (same). 
 16. Gruber, supra note 11, at 583–85. There is no one definition of feminism, and strands of 
feminism differ significantly in their concepts of gender equality and the strategies they adopt to 
address it. See id. at 603 n.112 (describing different forms of feminism and their ideologies). This 
Article uses the term “feminism” broadly to refer to an ideology founded on principles that 
support women’s autonomy and seek to eliminate substantive social, economic, political, and 
cultural gender inequalities. See id. 
 17. For relevant examples, see generally Katharine K. Baker, What Rape Is and What It 
Ought Not to Be, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 233 (1999) [hereinafter Baker, What Rape Is]; Baker, supra 
note 3; Gruber, supra note 11. Aya Gruber and Katharine Baker are particularly notable for their 
criticism of the criminal law model. Gruber criticizes the feminist focus on criminal law and calls 
for feminists to reassess their continued involvement in rape reform. See generally Gruber, supra 
note 11. Gruber’s work eloquently explores the tension between feminist tenets and feminism’s 
focus on stricter criminal sanctions for rape. The piece, however, stops short of providing an 
alternative legal framework for rape.  
 Baker has argued that criminal law reform will be ineffective absent a change in the social 
norms that encourage rape. See generally Baker, What Rape Is, supra. She proposed that social 
norms could be changed by the use of Title IX civil actions on college campuses and the use of 
shaming sanctions in college settings. See Baker, supra note 3, at 264–80; Katharine K. Baker, Sex, 
Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 695–714 (1999) [hereinafter Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame]. 
 Baker’s compelling work focuses on sanctions, which this Article argues are poor tools 
to change social norms. As with criminal law, those who make determinations of responsibility 
will continue to be influenced by social norms; they will similarly be reluctant to place blame on 
a perpetrator who was acting within social conventions, and may instead look to the victim’s 
responsibility for resisting sexual activity, particularly if the victim was drinking or consented to 
some sexual contact. See infra Part I.B. Moreover, sanctions lack the ability to explore positive 
sexual attitudes and behaviors and to address the range of sexual behavior that is problematic but 
nonetheless inappropriate for sanction. 
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prohibitive or punitive measures, such as university disciplinary 
proceedings.18 These civil law approaches face the same deficiencies 
that plague criminal law. Their effectiveness will be inevitably impaired 
by the fact that they must be meted in a culture that accepts gender 
stereotypes and rape myths. Penalizing measures are poor tools for 
prevention, as they do little to deter sexual aggression and even less to 
change the culture that encourages it. Nor can they provide a model of 
positive behavior or address the full spectrum of sexual behaviors and 
relationships that increase the risk of rape. We need a more 
fundamental shift in our understanding of rape law to engage these 
problems. 
This Article proposes a new framework for rape law that will add 
depth and breadth to rape law scholarship. A public health law 
framework challenges legal scholars and lawmakers to explore how 
laws and policies should address the complex cultural and social causes 
of rape and other sexual aggression. Public health law also affords a 
framework for legal scholars—and in particular feminist legal 
scholars—to consider how legal interventions can address the cultural 
attitudes and behaviors that contribute to sexual violence, rather than 
simply delineating those that merit criminal punishment. 
This Article does not argue for rape decriminalization—on the 
contrary, it envisions a legal dynamic that will bolster the efficacy of 
criminal laws prohibiting rape. Our justice system cannot prosecute 
offenses effectively absent a change in deeply entrenched social norms 
that normalize sexual aggression. Public health interventions, however, 
can help shift the norms that thwart criminal prosecution—norms that 
criminal law has long been ineffective in changing. 
 
 Title IX and campus sanctions also lack the scope necessary to address rape and the social 
norms that encourage and allow it. See Baker, supra note 3, at 276–77. Nearly half of rapes in the 
United States occur before a victim is eighteen. See infra note 67 and accompanying text. Focusing 
on universities also systematically excludes the poor and racial and ethnic minorities, who are 
often at higher risk for sexual assault and yet underrepresented in higher education. See KATE 
HARDING, ASKING FOR IT: THE ALARMING RISE OF RAPE CULTURE—AND WHAT WE CAN DO 
ABOUT IT, at xii (2015); Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 5.  
 18. Katharine Baker explores Title IX’s potential for civil actions on college campuses and 
the use of shaming sanctions on college campuses to change the social norms that encourage 
acquaintance rape. See supra note 17. 
 Allegra McLeod proposes that social institutional reform could increase transparency 
and accountability in ways more likely to hold perpetrators of sexual abuse accountable. See 
Allegra M. McLeod, Regulating Sexual Harm: Strangers, Intimates, and Social Institutional 
Reform, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1553, 1605–20 (2014). Like Baker, McLeod focuses almost exclusively 
on prevention through the use of punishment—or the threat thereof—to deter. See id.  
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A public health approach is also particularly well suited to address 
sexual assault because of the way that these social norms and 
conventions obscure the problem itself and do so in a way criminal law 
alone cannot resolve. Social norms do not thwart the effective 
prosecution of offenses such as assault and murder because these 
actions are widely accepted as harmful and wrong. In contrast, rape—
and acquaintance rape in particular—concerns behavior that is not 
widely accepted as criminal or harmful.19 We can therefore accomplish 
neither prevention nor successful prosecution without shifting these 
social norms. 
It is an opportune time to shift the legal discourse of rape. 
Lawmakers and the media are giving rape, particularly acquaintance 
rape on college campuses, unprecedented attention.20 Federal law 
requires colleges to take affirmative steps to respond to allegations of 
sexual assault,21 and states have passed or proposed laws that require 
universities to use affirmative-consent standards in campus disciplinary 
hearings.22 The White House recently convened a task force on campus 
rape and launched a media campaign against sexual assault.23 The 
 
 19. See infra Part I.B. 
 20. See Janet Halley, The Move to Affirmative Consent, 42 SIGNS 257, 257 (2016); 
Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 6–14; Jake New, The “Yes Means Yes” World, INSIDE HIGHER  
ED (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/10/17/colleges-across-country-
adopting-affirmative-consent-sexual-assault-policies [https://perma.cc/Q8UV-9V8H].  
 21. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1686 (2012); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON TITLE IX AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, at i (2014), http://www2.
ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/qa-201404-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZF4M-AXY5]; see also 
Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., to Colleagues (Apr. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Dear Colleague Letter], http://www2.ed.gov/
about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/JZ9J-WTX9] (explaining the 
responsibilities of educators “to respond promptly and effectively to sexual violence against 
students” as required by federal law).  
 22. E.g., S. 967, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (codified at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386 
(West 2015)); see Halley, supra note 20, at 257 (compiling laws); Tuerkheimer, supra note 12, at 
6–10 (describing increased attention to consent standards on campuses); New, supra note 20 
(discussing measures passed by California and New York and proposed by legislators in New 
Hampshire and New Jersey that adopt an “affirmative consent” standard for campus sexual-
assault policy). 
 23. Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Executive Departments 
and Agencies, Establishing a White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault 
(Jan. 22, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/22/memorandum-establish
ing-white-house-task-force-protect-students-sexual-a [https://perma.cc/6KZ4-C453]; see Tanya 
Somanader, President Obama Launches the “It’s on Us” Campaign to End Sexual Assault on 
Campus, WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Sept. 19, 2014, 2:40 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2014/
09/19/President-Obama-launches-its-US-campaign-ebd-sexual-assault-campus [https://perma.cc/
UL73-JKXD]. 
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American Law Institute is at long last redrafting the anachronistic 
Model Penal Code provisions on rape.24 Meanwhile, the nation intently 
watched the coverage of rape trials involving students from 
Steubenville High School, St. Paul’s School, Stanford University, and 
Vanderbilt University.25 
Despite this increased attention, rape law remains locked in a 
prohibition-based model. Legal scholars, advocates, and lawmakers 
continue to fixate on how best to find and punish perpetrators—how 
to reform criminal law or create effective and fair university 
disciplinary proceedings.26 The Rape Abuse and Incest National 
Network’s much-awaited recommendations to a White House task 
force stressed the importance of criminal proceedings and specifically 
warned against efforts to address the underlying cultural causes against 
rape.27 The song gets louder, but the tune remains the same. 
Part I of this Article argues that the framing of rape law as first 
and foremost criminal law will continue to be ineffective given 
prevailing social and cultural norms. Specifically, it explores the law’s 
dubious progress in creating criminal statutes that address rape—
particularly acquaintance rape—effectively and justly. Absent 
significant change to our culture’s current gender and sexual norms, 
juries interpret the law in accordance with social norms that embrace 
 
 24. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND RELATED OFFENSES § 213 (AM. LAW 
INST., Proposed Amended Version 2016), https://www.ali.org/projects/show/sexual-assault-and-
related-offenses/ [https://perma.cc/NH9L-UF5G]; see also Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Consent, 
Culpability, and the Law of Rape, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397, 414, 429 (2016) (analyzing 
proposed Model Penal Code provisions).  
 25. See Jess Bidgood, Owen Labrie of St. Paul’s School Is Found Not Guilty of Main Rape 
Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2015, at A9; Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Ohio Teenagers Guilty in Rape 
that Social Media Brought to Light, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2013, at A10; Marina Koren, Why the 
Stanford Judge Gave Brock Turner Six Months, ATLANTIC (June 17, 2016), http://www.
theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/06/stanford-rape-case-judge/487415/ [https://perma.cc/88ZP-
B79F]; Jessica Luther, A Look at the Vanderbilt Rape Case that Left a Community Reeling, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.si.com/college-football/2015/02/09/vanderbilt-
rape-case-brandon-vandenburg-cory-batey [https://perma.cc/6VQ6-BPJ6]; Jeannie Suk, St. 
Paul’s School and the New Definition of Rape, NEW YORKER (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.
newyorker.com/news/news-desk/st-pauls-school-and-a-new-definition-of-rape [https://perma.cc/
RDG4-BD5Q]. 
 26. See Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to 
Reform, 125 YALE L.J. 1940, 1999–2004 (2016); Jeb Rubenfeld, Mishandling Rape, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 16, 2014, at SR1; Michelle Goldberg, Why the Campus Rape Crisis Confounds Colleges, 
NATION (June 5, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/why-campus-rape-crisis-confounds-
colleges [https://perma.cc/Z35U-TR8L]. 
 27. See Letter from the Rape, Abuse, & Incest National Network to the White House Task 
Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault (Feb. 28, 2014), https://rainn.org/images/03-2014/
WH-Task-Force-RAINN-Recommendations.pdf [https://perma.cc/DX8T-ALC7]. 
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rape myths, thwarting even the most progressive of criminal law 
reforms. Juries cannot simply ignore these social norms because they 
may be integral to a defendant’s mens rea. 
Part II sets forth an alternative framework: a public health law 
approach to rape. First, this Part argues that public health law is well 
suited to deal with the challenges that rape poses, contrasting its 
strengths with the shortcomings of criminal law. Next, it examines 
public health law interventions that could comprise this new rape law 
framework, and how this approach would enrich feminist legal 
scholarship by providing a framework in which to meet the challenge 
of “theorizing yes.” Finally, the Article addresses possible criticisms of 
the public health approach. 
I.  THE FAILURE OF CRIMINAL LAW 
A. Criminal Law’s Dubious Progress 
1. Struggling with Legal Standards.  In the United States, rape law 
is criminal law.28 To some degree, this makes sense. Rape deserves 
criminal punishment. Punishment can also serve a deterrent effect, 
preventing future rapes.29 Criminalization in some form is therefore 
warranted by retributivism—the dominant theory of criminal law, 
which focuses on desert—as well as utilitarianism, which focuses on 
social utility. 
Traditional rape law recognized and protected only a particular 
paradigm: a virtuous woman who fights to her utmost against a 
pathological and violent stranger.30 It was limited to unlawful 
intercourse by a man against a woman who was not his wife by force or 
threat and against her will.31 Taken as a whole, these laws enforced 
norms of male dominance over female sexuality and simply ignored or 
 
 28. See Baker, What Rape Is, supra note 17, at 234; Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, 
and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 835 (1988); Gruber, supra note 
11, at 586–602.  
 29. See Baker, What Rape Is, supra note 17, at 234 (discussing the failure of deterrence in 
rape law). 
 30. See David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 320–21 (2000); 
Dressler, supra note 13, at 410–11, 415–18; Dripps, supra note 13, at 1780–83; Estrich, supra note 
12, at 1090–91, 1094; Gruber, supra note 11, at 587–88; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, 
Marxism, Method, and the State: Towards Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 648–49 (1983). 
 31. See WERTHEIMER, supra note 12, at 11. 
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rejected queer sexuality.32 Rape was a crime against male ownership, 
be it a father’s ownership of his daughter’s virtue or a husband’s sole 
and unassailable right to his wife’s body.33 Unwanted and even forcible 
sex that did not upset this model of ownership was simply not rape. Nor 
did rape law acknowledge the rape of men or same-sex rape.34 
Lawmakers, advocates, and legal scholars—particularly 
feminists—have made significant efforts to reform these laws.35 
Disagreement persists about how to define the actus reus and mens rea 
of rape. While both the types of proposals and their success in 
reforming laws have varied among jurisdictions, modern rape law 
reflects common themes in how it defines its actus reus and mens rea.36 
Force was an essential component of the actus reus in traditional 
rape law and remains influential.37 The requirement that the defendant 
use or threaten force to achieve intercourse created a corresponding 
requirement that the woman physically resist sex or else prove that she 
reasonably feared resistance would result in injury.38 Legal scholars 
and advocates have leveled several legitimate criticisms of the force 
 
 32. See Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1288–90 (2011); Gruber, 
supra note 11, at 587–90; see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY 
OF THE STATE 171, 172–73 (1989) (discussing rape’s historical definition as a crime against male 
exclusive access and female monogamy). 
 33. See MACKINNON, supra note 32, at 172–75; Baker, supra note 3, at 225–27; Capers, supra 
note 32, at 1288–89; Dripps, supra note 13, at 1780–83; William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Many Faces 
of Sexual Consent, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 47, 56 (1995) (discussing the marital rape exception); 
see also BROWNMILLER, supra note 3, at 16–18, 29 (stating that “[a] crime committed against her 
body became a crime against the male estate”). 
 34. See Capers, supra note 32, at 1290; Eskridge, supra note 33, at 55–59; see also Elizabeth 
J. Kramer, Note, When Men Are Victims: Applying Rape Shield Laws to Male Same-Sex Rape, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 293, 311–18 (1998) (discussing dismissive attitudes toward same-sex rape). 
 35. See Baker, supra note 3, at 228–32; Eskridge, supra note 33, at 58–59; Gruber, supra note 
11, at 591–92. 
 36. See Bryden, supra note 30, at 322–23; Estrich, supra note 12, at 1133–61.  
 37. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 2–3; Dripps, supra note 13, at 1783; Dan M. Kahan, 
Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 
U. PA. L. REV. 729, 745 (2010); MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 649–50; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rape 
in the Twilight Zone: When Sex Is Unwanted But Not Illegal, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 415, 416 
(2005).  
 38. See Bryden, supra note 30, at 356–60; Estrich, supra note 12, at 1099–1121; see also 
Gruber, supra note 11, at 588–89 (discussing the historical necessity of a woman’s forceful 
resistance to support a claim of rape); Kahan, supra note 37, at 745 (same); MacKinnon, supra 
note 30, at 650 (exploring contexts in which forceful resistance may not necessarily indicate lack 
of consent, and in which lack of forceful resistance may not necessarily indicate the presence of 
consent).  
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and resistance requirements.39 They shift the focus from the 
defendant’s actions to whether the victim properly took the required—
and often dangerous—steps to avoid unwanted sex.40 The resistance 
requirement also requires the victim to place herself in danger, as 
resistance is often met with increased force and injury. It fails to 
account for the many victims who freeze from fear or anxiety rather 
than fight back against an attacker,41 and courts’ narrow interpretations 
of the force requirement are also dismissive of the fear and 
intimidation that permeate many relationships.42 
Because of these flaws, modern rape law and legal scholarship 
have attempted to shift the focus from force to consent.43 “Legal 
consent,” as Peter Westen has termed it, applies only when a partner 
acquiesces to sex under circumstances the law deems sufficiently free 
and voluntary.44 In general, rape law reform has focused on two 
approaches to consent: (1) “no means no” and (2) “yes means yes.” 
 
 39. See Bryden, supra note 30, at 322, 355 (noting that virtually all modern rape scholars 
want to modify or abolish the force requirement). 
 40. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 3, at 360–61, 373; Estrich, supra note 12, at 1099–1121; 
Gruber, supra note 11, at 589, 593–94; MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 650. But see Bryden, supra 
note 30, at 365–68 (arguing that the risk of injury from resisting is overstated). 
 41. See Grace Galliano, Linda M. Noble, Carol Puechl & Linda A. Travis, Victim Reactions 
During Rape/Sexual Assault: A Preliminary Study of the Immobility Response and Its Correlates, 
8 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 107, 108 (1993); see also BROWNMILLER, supra note 3, at 358 
(exploring how the initial stages of a rape often dictate the woman’s level of resistance); 
MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 650 (“Women are socialized to passive receptivity . . . [and may] 
submit to survive.”); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Rape Is a Major Public Health Issue, 86 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 15, 16 (1996) (exploring the psychological state of “frozen fright”).  
 42. See, e.g., State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470, 476 (N.C. 1984); see also Dressler, supra note 
13, at 418 (criticizing the Alston decision due to the lack of concern given to the victim’s psyche); 
Estrich, supra note 12, at 1108–12 (same).  
 43. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 1404 (demonstrating that academic proposals for rape 
reform assert that rape should be defined as sex without consent); Vivian Berger, Rape Law 
Reform at the Millennium: Remarks on Professor Bryden’s Non-Millennial Approach, 3 BUFF. 
CRIM. L. REV. 513, 514–15, 519–29 (2000) (discussing the definition of consent as the challenge of 
modern rape reform); Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 LAW & PHIL. 217, 218 
(1989) (noting that “the criteria for consent continues to be the central concern of discourse on 
sexual assault”). Some scholars, however, reject both force and consent as an adequate basis for 
actus reus. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 13, at 1414–21.  
 44. See PETER WESTEN, THE LOGIC OF CONSENT 6–10, 107–09 (2004); Heidi M. Hurd, The 
Moral Magic of Consent, 2 LEGAL THEORY 121, 122–23 (1996) (discussing the circumstances in 
which an individual’s acquiescence should be deemed to constitute consent, both morally and 
legally). In the context of rape law, legal scholars such as Stephen Schulhofer have argued that 
consent serves to protect an individual’s “sexual autonomy”—the ability to choose when and 
under what circumstances to have sex (positive sexual autonomy) or to not have sex (negative 
sexual autonomy). See SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 99–113. But see Kathryn Abrams, From 
Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 
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“No means no” allows that verbal resistance, rather than physical 
resistance, should be sufficient to establish nonconsent.45 Some legal 
scholars have criticized this approach for criminalizing too much, citing 
research that partners may express “token resistance” when they do 
really want to have sex.46 Others argue that “no means no” puts the 
burden on the partner who does not want to have sex—the partner who 
may be frozen in fear.47 
In contrast, the “yes means yes” or “affirmative consent” standard 
shifts the burden to the defendant to determine whether his partner 
affirmatively consents to sex.48 It rejects the notion that a person can 
proceed on the assumption that his partner wants sex absent evidence 
to the contrary and requires instead that an individual look for 
 
passim (1999) (proposing the concept of sexual agency rather than sexual autonomy); Deborah 
Tuerkheimer, Sex Without Consent, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335, 339 (2013) [hereinafter 
Tuerkheimer, Sex Without Consent] (same); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Slutwalking in the Shadow of 
the Law, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1453, 1493–96 (2014) [hereinafter Tuerkheimer, Slutwalking] (same); 
see also Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 1379 (arguing that the harms and wrongs of rape are not 
fully captured by the use of a sexual autonomy framework).  
 Lawmakers and scholars continue to debate under what circumstances unwanted sex 
should be considered nonconsensual under the law, such as unwanted sex in which a partner 
succumbs to badgering, unwanted sex in exchange for something of value, or unwanted sex within 
relationships that are abusive or have power imbalances. See, e.g., SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, 
at 107–08, 111–13, 114–253 (discussing different reasons women may consent to sex and the 
dilemmas they pose for rape law); Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows, Guilty of the Crime of 
Trust: Nonstranger Rape, 75 MINN. L. REV. 599, 609–17 (1991) (analyzing consent in “dominance 
relationships”); Anne C. Dailey, The Psychodynamics of Sexual Choice, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 343, 
350–80 (2015) (discussing consent in the context of adult incest, a therapist-client relationship, 
and a sadomasochistic relationship); MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 646–47 (arguing that women 
do not have a real choice to have sex with men because of the systemic dominance of men); Robin 
L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 
1452–59 (1993) (discussing consent to sex in exchange for safety from abuse or economic security). 
 45. See Estrich, supra note 12, at 1182–84 (arguing for a “no means no” standard); see also 
Anderson, supra note 26, at 1950. 
 46. See, e.g., Bryden, supra note 30, at 388–90; Dressler, supra note 13, at 433–36; Douglas 
N. Husak & George C. Thomas III, Date Rape, Social Convention, and Reasonable Mistakes, 11 
LAW & PHIL. 95, 113–23 (1992); Kahan, supra note 37, at 731, 746–49. 
 47. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 269–73; Anderson, supra note 13, at 1412; Berger, 
supra note 43, at 513, 520–24. Dressler, for example, is a proponent of “no means no” and argues 
that women who do not desire sex have a burden to let their opposition be known. See Dressler, 
supra note 13, at 414 (“[Women] have as much responsibility to express their feelings about 
intimacy as the male has the duty to make reasonable efforts to learn a female’s wishes.”). 
Dressler’s approach allows the law to presume that sex is consensual unless a woman fulfills her 
burden of letting her partner know she does not desire sex. See id. 
 48. See State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992); SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 
269–73; Anderson, supra note 13, at 1412. In State ex rel. M.T.S., the New Jersey Supreme Court 
interpreted a statute’s force requirement to include any sex that lacks “affirmative and freely-
given permission.” See M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1277.  
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evidence of his partner’s voluntary engagement.49 The affirmative-
consent standard has gained the most traction in laws specifying 
standards for university disciplinary codes and has thus far rarely been 
employed in criminal law.50 Critics of affirmative consent argue that the 
concept is overinclusive and lacks clarity.51 
The second component of a rape offense is mens rea: the mental 
state an individual must have to be found guilty. A central tenet of 
retributivist theory is that criminal law should not punish behavior 
unless it causes or risks harm and unless the defendant acts with a 
blameworthy state of mind.52 The dominant theory of criminal justice 
in both scholarship and practice therefore places an enormous 
emphasis on the defendant’s mens rea.53 In the context of rape, mens 
rea issues rarely arise with regard to the sexual act itself, as most 
defendants are aware that they are engaging in a sexual act.54 Rape law 
struggles, however, with how to determine whether a defendant had a 
culpable state of mind toward the victim’s nonconsent.55 
 
 49. See Baker, What Rape Is, supra note 17, at 241. 
 50. See supra note 22. 
 51. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 13, at 1412–14; Dressler, supra note 13, at 425. For 
example, Beverly Balos and Mary Louise Fellows argue that consent cannot be freely given in an 
abusive relationship. See Balos & Fellows, supra note 44, at 609–11. Vivian Berger criticizes this 
stance as “yes means no.” See Berger, supra note 43, at 522; see also Bryden, supra note 30, at 
350–55 (discussing consent in the context of abusive relationships). 
 52. See LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN WITH STEPHEN J. MORSE, 
CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 298, 300–02 (2009); R.A. DUFF, 
ANSWERING FOR CRIME 168–71 (2007); Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE 
L.J. 609, 656 (1984); see also DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION 155–77 (2008) (arguing 
that this tenet is not being adhered to, creating an overcriminalization problem); Guy Ben-David, 
Cognitive Void in Relation to Attendant Circumstances as Subjective Mens Rea, 18 NEW CRIM. L. 
REV. 418, 453 (2015) (discussing general culpability principles); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Self-
Defense and the State, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 449, 478 (2008) (expressing uncertainty as to whether 
the overinclusivity of the rule of imminence in self-defense is acceptable to retributivist thinkers).  
 53. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 
83 & n.1 (1997); Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 
823 (2007); Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 
96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 845–47, 846 n.6 (2002); Dressler, supra note 13, at 431; Estrich, supra note 
12, at 1095 (explaining that the mens rea requirement helps avoid unjust convictions); Douglas N. 
Husak & George C. Thomas III, Rapes Without Rapists: Consent and Reasonable Mistake, 11 
PHIL. ISSUES 86, 86–87 (2001); Matthew Haist, Comment, Deterrence in a Sea of “Just Deserts”: 
Are Utilitarian Goals Achievable in a World of “Limiting Retributivism”?, 99 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 789, 799–804 (2009).  
 54. See Charlow, supra note 14, at 268; Estrich, supra note 12, at 1095–96; Pineau, supra note 
43, at 218. 
 55. See Bryden, supra note 30, at 324–25; Charlow, supra note 14, at 268; Estrich, supra note 
12, at 1096.  
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For decades, rape law had a counterintuitive approach to mens 
rea. Traditional rape law had no formal mens rea requirement, and 
American legislatures and courts often drafted or construed rape law 
to lack a specific mens rea requirement.56 Ordinarily, this would make 
prosecution much easier.57 In the context of rape, however, legislatures 
often used narrow actus reus requirements to approximate a guilty 
mindset.58 For example, the force requirement served as a proxy for 
mens rea by limiting the offense only to those who clearly knew that 
their partner was not consenting.59 
Rape law reforms and scholarship struggle with how to rectify 
rape law’s problematic approach to mens rea. Legislatures and scholars 
debate what types of mental states as to consent merit punishment; that 
is, whether the law should require intent, knowledge, recklessness, or 
negligence.60 If recklessness and negligence are punished, the law must 
also determine what it means to be reckless or negligent as to 
nonconsent—namely, what it means to grossly deviate from the 
“reasonable person” standard.61 
2. Data on Rape Contradict the Assumptions Underlying Criminal 
Law.  Even as lawmakers and scholars grapple with these questions, 
criminal law remains a weak tool for addressing rape in the United 
States, particularly rapes that do not fit the paradigm of the evil 
stranger and innocent victim.62 “Acquaintance rape” cases, for 
 
 56. See Bryden, supra note 30, at 325; Charlow, supra note 14, at 273–76; Estrich, supra note 
12, at 1095–98; Husak & Thomas, supra note 46, at 98. 
 57. See Estrich, supra note 12, at 1098. 
 58. See Dressler, supra note 13, at 431–32 (arguing that mens rea issues were only a problem 
before reform); Kahan, supra note 37, at 743 (showing that mens rea has little practical 
consequence if force is required).  
 59. See Bryden, supra note 30, at 340 (arguing that a good-faith mistake in consent will be 
rare if the law requires a defendant to have overcome the victim’s resistance with force); Estrich, 
supra note 12, at 1098–99 (noting that rapes effected by use of force render a defense that the 
victim consented implausible); see also Larry Alexander, You Got What You Deserved, 7 CRIM. 
L. & PHIL. 309, 311 (2013) (arguing that evidence of a partner’s consent bears on the recklessness 
of the defendant’s conduct more than on the existence of consent). 
 60. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 59, at 310–18 (discussing recklessness and mistake); 
Byrnes, supra note 13, at 293–99 (proposing a “[n]egligence [t]oward the [w]ill” standard); 
Dressler, supra note 13, at 438–39 (arguing for a reasonable belief standard); Estrich, supra note 
12, at 1097–1105 (arguing for a negligence standard); Pineau, supra note 43, at 218 (discussing the 
reasonable belief standard).  
 61. See generally Husak & Thomas, supra note 46 (discussing reasonableness as to beliefs in 
consent); Pineau, supra note 43 (arguing for reasonableness from a woman’s perspective). For a 
discussion of reasonableness in the context of recklessness and negligence, see infra Part I.B.2.  
 62. See Gruber, supra note 11, at 594–95, 639–40. 
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example, which occur when the defendant knows the victim, are the 
most common type of rape in the United States. Yet they are also the 
cases that police are least likely to investigate and that prosecutors are 
least likely to pursue, and, ultimately, those in which juries are least 
likely to convict.63 Rape—and specifically acquaintance rape and rape 
involving intoxication—remains exceedingly difficult to prosecute.64 
Criminal law and scholarship often ignore the rape of men by women 
and rape in the context of queer relationships.64 As a result, rape 
remains undeterred, underreported, and underprosecuted.65 
A 2011 survey by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) demonstrated the high prevalence of rape and contradicted 
many common misconceptions. Rape by physical force or the use of 
alcohol or drugs to incapacitate the victim is quite common among 
women: approximately 20 percent experienced this type of rape or an 
attempt thereof in their lifetime.66 It also occurs largely among minors, 
with 42.2 percent of women who were raped by force or intoxication 
victimized before age eighteen.67 In addition, the survey results showed 
that 13 percent of women reported experiencing sexual coercion—
unwanted sexual penetration after being pressured in a nonphysical 
way—in their lifetime.68 
 
 63. See Baker, supra note 3, at 235–36; Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 3, at 1251–52; Lisak 
& Miller, supra note 3, at 73; Spohn & Holleran, supra note 3, at 682; see also BROWNMILLER, 
supra note 3, at 351–52 (stating that police are more likely to find allegations of stranger rapes to 
be founded than allegations of acquaintance rapes). 
 64. See Baker, What Rape Is, supra note 17, at 234; Bryden, supra note 30, at 318; Gruber, 
supra note 11, at 597–98, 600. 
 64. See Michelle Davies, Male Sexual Assault Victims: A Selective Review of the Literature 
and Implications for Support Services, 7 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 203, 204–06 (2002); 
Alletta Brenner, Note, Resisting Simple Dichotomies: Critiquing Narratives of Victims, 
Perpetrators, and Harm in Feminist Theories of Rape, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 503, 526–28, 527 
n.106 (2013); see also Kim Shayo Buchanan, Engendering Rape, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1630, 1632–45 
(2012) (writing in the context of prison rape). 
 65. See NAT’L VICTIM CTR., RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 5 (1992); Baker, 
What Rape Is, supra note 17, at 234; Bryden, supra note 30, at 318; Gruber, supra note 11, at 585, 
627; MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 651.  
 66. See NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
& PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY 17–18 
(2010) [hereinafter CDC SURVEY], https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report
2010-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ5W-RYGG]. 
 67. See id. at 2, 25. Another study found that 60.4 percent of female victims and 69.2 percent 
of male victims were first raped before age eighteen. See Kathleen C. Basile, Jieru Chen, Michele 
C. Black & Linda E. Saltzman, Prevalence and Characteristics of Sexual Violence Victimization 
Among U.S. Adults, 2001–2003, 22 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 437, 443 (2007). 
 68. CDC SURVEY, supra note 66, at 2, 19. 
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The survey data also contradict the notion that women do not rape 
men, and that male-against-male rape is not a problem.69 Nearly 5 
percent of men reported that they were made to penetrate someone 
else during their lifetime.70 The perpetrator was female in nearly 80 
percent of forced penetrations.71 Sexual coercion was even more 
common, with 6 percent of men reporting sexual coercion in their 
lifetime.72 84 percent of these victims reported a female perpetrator.73 
Of the men who reported being victims of rape, 93 percent identified 
the perpetrator as male.74 This high rate is perhaps unsurprising given 
that other types of sexual violence were distinguished from rape, which 
was limited to penetration of the victim.75  
In contrast to the paradigmatic stranger rape, rape is 
overwhelmingly perpetrated by someone the victim knows, and usually 
by an intimate partner. In the context of rape by force or 
incapacitation, more than half of female victims reported being raped 
by an intimate partner and over 40 percent by an acquaintance.76 
Where men were forced to penetrate another, the perpetrator was an 
intimate partner or acquaintance nearly 90 percent of the time.77 An 
intimate partner was the perpetrator of sexual coercion for 75 percent 
of female victims and 70 percent of male victims.78 
In sum, despite criminal law reform, rape remains a significant 
problem that contradicts common assumptions. It is widespread among 
women, but also occurs among men. Women sexually coerce men and 
force penetration. Despite the prominent focus on campus rape, a 
substantial portion of it occurs before the victims are college aged.79 
 
 69. For a discussion of the issue in the context of prison rape, see Shayo Buchanan, supra 
note 64, at 1632–45. The CDC Survey, perhaps reflecting this bias, distinguished forced 
penetration of another as a category distinct from rape. CDC SURVEY, supra note 66, at 2, 19.  
 70. See CDC SURVEY, supra note 66, at 2, 19. 
 71. Id. at 24. 
 72. Id. at 19. 
 73. Id. at 24. 
 74. Id. Perpetrators were also overwhelmingly male for female rape victims (98.1 percent). 
Id. 
 75. See id. at 2, 19. 
 76. Id. at 1–2, 21.  
 77. Id. at 22–23. 
 78. Id.  
 79. It is also more prevalent among racial groups that are underrepresented in college. While 
18.8 percent of white women experienced rape, the numbers were as high as 22 percent among 
African American women, 26.9 percent among First Nations women, and 33.5 percent among 
multiracial women. Id. at 2–3, 20–21.  
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Perpetrators are rarely strangers and are far more likely to be intimate 
partners. These results—particularly the prevalence of intimate-
partner sexual violence—challenge the notion that most rape is the 
product of a few serial rapists.80 
The results also demonstrate that rape occurs in a larger 
environment of sexual intimidation. More than one in four women and 
approximately one in nine men have experienced some form of 
unwanted sexual contact in their lifetime. For both men and women, 
perpetrators of this unwanted sexual contact were intimate partners or 
acquaintances approximately 70 percent of the time.81 Nearly one in 
three women and nearly one in eight men experienced some type of 
noncontact unwanted sexual experience in their lifetime.82 
B. The Double Bind of Criminal Law and Rape 
1. Social Norms Render Rape Law Ineffective.  Although 
reforming the criminal law of rape is necessary, this single step is 
decidedly insufficient. The words of statutes themselves are unlikely to 
effect real change in the reporting, prosecution, or prevention of rape 
without significant change to the underlying culture in which those 
statutes are interpreted and applied.83 Social norms about sex, consent, 
and gender roles encourage an adversarial approach to sex and consent 
and perpetuate myths about rape.84 Whatever the text of the law, it is 
 
 80. This assumption was popularized by a 2002 study that attributed campus rape to small 
numbers of repeat offenders. See Lisak & Miller, supra note 3, at 78–79; see also Amelia Thomson-
Deveaux, What if Most Campus Rapes Aren’t Committed by Serial Rapists?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT 
(July 13, 2015), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-if-most-campus-rapes-arent-committed-
by-serial-rapists/ [https://perma.cc/Q6LZ-36LC] (describing the widespread popularity of the 
study’s results and its use by authorities). A subsequent study of campus rape concluded that the 
small group of repeat offenders constituted a significant minority of those who committed rape in 
college. Kevin M. Swartout et al., Trajectory Analysis of the Campus Serial Rapist Assumption, 
169 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. PEDIATRICS 1148, 1148 (2015). 
 81. See CDC SURVEY, supra note 66, at 22–23. 
 82. See id. at 2. 
 83. See Baker, What Rape Is, supra note 17, at 236 (“Society, through language and other 
systems of meaning, defines what sex is just as it defines what rape is.”); Estrich, supra note 12, at 
1093 (“[T]he problem has never been the words of the statutes as much as our interpretation of 
them.”); Gruber, supra note 11, at 630–33 (discussing the cultural messages and pressures that 
women and men receive); Schulhofer, supra note 37, at 415 (“Part of the reason [the law is 
unsuccessful in preventing rape] is that fundamental change in our culture is still very 
incomplete.”). 
 84. See Estrich, supra note 12, at 1093; Gruber, supra note 11, at 597–98, 630–33; Pineau, 
supra note 43, at 222; see also Tracy N. Hipp et al., Justifying Sexual Assault: Anonymous 
Perpetrators Speak Out Online, PSYCH. VIOLENCE ONLINE, 2015, at 4, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/
KAPLAN IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2017  9:25 AM 
2017] RAPE BEYOND CRIME 1063 
highly likely that these social norms will continue to thwart its practical 
effect. 
Rape law is particularly stymied by the common understanding 
that sex is something to be negotiated or won from partners, 
specifically from women by men.85 The idea that sex with a woman is 
something that an aggressive, sexual male achieves is deeply embedded 
in our understanding of sex, rape, femininity, and masculinity.86 It 
characterizes men as driven by a strong natural sex drive that women 
have a responsibility to resist.87 A man’s ability to obtain sex from a 
woman—to “score”—is a measure of his masculinity and self-worth.88 
This understanding pits women against men in a “mating dance,” 
where women are the gatekeepers to sex and men the pursuers.89 
 
a0039998 [http://perma.cc/55WU-6A46] (giving examples of “sexual scripts” at work in first-
person narratives of rape and sexual assault). 
 85. See AM. COLL. HEALTH ASS’N, SHIFTING THE PARADIGM: PRIMARY PREVENTION OF 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE 8 (2007) [hereinafter SHIFTING THE PARADIGM]; Baker, supra note 3, at 230, 
247; Jill Filipovic, Offensive Feminism: The Conservative Gender Norms That Perpetuate Rape 
Culture, and How Feminists Can Fight Back, in YES MEANS YES: VISIONS OF FEMALE SEXUAL 
POWER AND A WORLD WITHOUT RAPE 13, 17–19 (Jaclyn Friedman & Jessica Valenti eds., 2008); 
Gruber, supra note 11, at 631; Hipp et al., supra note 84, at 4.  
 86. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 256; Estrich, supra note 12, at 1093; see also 
HARDING, supra note 17, at 1 (stating that we live in a culture that rewards men for having sex 
with as many random women as possible); Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, supra note 17, at 670 
(stating a similar proposition); Filipovic, supra note 85, at 18–19 (stating that male sexuality is 
aggressive and that sex is something that men “do” to women); Hipp et al., supra note 84, at 4 
(describing rape perpetrators’ citing of sexual scripts, in particular that men desire sex and are 
supposed to initiate it, and that women have weaker sex drives or resist male advances); 
MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 635 (arguing that the difference between men and women is the 
dominance/submission dynamic that defines the relationship); Brad Perry, Hooking Up with 
Healthy Sexuality: The Lessons Boys Learn (and Don’t Learn) About Sexuality and Why a Sex-
Positive Rape Prevention Paradigm Can Benefit Everyone Involved, in YES MEANS YES, supra 
note 85, at 193–94 (recalling how, as a teenager, he got the message that sex was a one-sided affair 
where men were supposed to “get some”); Pineau, supra note 43, at 222 (stating a similar 
proposition); Shayo Buchanan, supra note 64, at 1640–42 (same). 
 87. See Filipovic, supra note 85, at 20; Hipp et al., supra note 84, at 5. 
 88. See HARDING, supra note 17, at 1; SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 256; Baker, Sex, Rape, 
and Shame, supra note 17, at 670–77; Estrich, supra note 12, at 1093; Filipovic, supra note 85, at 
19; Hipp et al., supra note 84, at 4; MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 650; Perry, supra note 86, at 193; 
Pineau, supra note 43, at 222; see also Jeannie Suk, Redistributing Rape, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
111, 111 (2011) (describing male rape of other men in prison as a way of proving masculinity and 
dominating the other man by making him “feminine”). 
 89. See Hipp et al., supra note 84, at 4 (“Denial of resistance . . . is the notion that women 
actually mean ‘yes’ when they say ‘no’ to sex. This belief is grounded in the idea that women 
should be resistant and reserved in sexual interactions and that men should persist in response to 
a woman’s resistance.”); see also SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 256 (stating a similar 
proposition); Filipovic, supra note 85, at 19–20 (same); Gruber, supra note 11, at 630–32 (same); 
Perry, supra note 86, at 200–01 (same). 
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Women who want sex—or who do not object to sex—fulfill their role 
as gatekeepers by putting up some token resistance or passively 
acquiescing to sex.90 This understanding of sex and consent therefore 
deems it normal and acceptable for men to persist, cajole, or simply 
continue despite a woman’s protests or disengagement.91 A woman 
who wants sex will eventually accede; a woman who does not want sex 
will actively and continuously resist absent serious threat of harm.92 
Social norms about women’s sexual activity also influence 
perceptions of rape. Women who have engaged in sexual activity, who 
have flirted with the perpetrator, or who were drinking at the time are 
often perceived as less likely to have been raped or responsible for 
their own rapes.93 These women are also commonly perceived as 
untrustworthy complainants.94 In particular, women of color, poor 
women, and sex workers—women who have historically been subject 
to stereotypes of hypersexuality—must overcome negative 
assumptions about their credibility.95 
 
 90. See Baker, supra note 3, at 230; Filipovic, supra note 85, at 20. 
 91. Donald Dripps writes: “[M]any think the woman’s ‘no’ of less than dispositive 
significance. This attitude toward the evidence is wrong-headed, but deeply imbedded in social 
practice.” Dripps, supra note 13, at 1804 (comparing “back-seat bargaining on Prom Night” to 
haggling over jewelry); see also Baker, supra note 3, at 230 (stating that sexual scripts and norms 
dictate that men are supposed to be aggressive and women are supposed to be passive, with the 
woman saying no when she really means yes, and the man proceeding after this ambiguity); 
Gruber, supra note 11, at 630–33 (stating a similar proposition). 
 92. See Hipp et al., supra note 84, at 4 (describing perpetrators’ beliefs that women need to 
resist more if they truly do not want sex). 
 93. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 3, at 374; Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, supra note 17, at 
682–84; Bryden, supra note 30, at 318–19; Gruber, supra note 11, at 595–96; Lisa Jervis, An Old 
Enemy in a New Outfit: How Date Rape Became Gray Rape and Why It Matters, in YES MEANS 
YES, supra note 85, at 163, 169; Andrew Taslitz, Forgetting Freud: The Courts’ Fear of the 
Subconscious in Date Rape (and Other) Cases, 16 B.U. PUB. INT’L L.J. 145, 155 (2007); 
Tuerkheimer, Slutwalking, supra note 44, at 1473. For studies on this phenomenon, see Hipp et 
al., supra note 84, at 1 (citing studies in which men state “that a man could assume that a woman 
wanted to have sex if she had previously engaged in consensual sexual contact, such as sexual 
touching or oral sex”); id. at 4 (citing victim blame where victim had flirted with them or had 
consensual sex with them previously). See also Gruber, supra note 11, at 595 n.78 (citing 
qualitative studies in which participants identify rape victims who dress “seductively” as partially 
responsible for their own rapes). 
 94. See Gruber, supra note 11, at 595–600. 
 95. See BROWNMILLER, supra note 3, at 365–67; Gruber, supra note 11, at 595–600; Samhita 
Mukhopadhyay, Trial by Media: Black Female Lasciviousness and the Question of Consent, in 
YES MEANS YES, supra note 85, at 151, 153–61; Tuerkheimer, Slutwalking, supra note 44, at 1483–
84. 
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These social norms contribute to what some scholars and activists 
term “rape culture.”96 This concept frames rape not as the isolated acts 
of individuals, but rather as part of a culture that fosters male sexual 
aggression and violence against women.97 Rape culture encourages 
“[t]he attitude that men are entitled to anything from women, as they 
are people and [women] are the designated sex class.”98 
The role of these norms in sexual violence is evident from the 
research on those who commit rape. Risk factors for committing sexual 
assault include: being male; adherence to societal norms supportive of 
sexual violence, male superiority, and male sexual entitlement; and 
being raised in an emotionally unsupportive environment.99 
Perpetrators demonstrate feelings of entitlement to women’s bodies or 
the need to dominate women.100 They cite sexual scripts—namely, that 
men always desire sex and are supposed to initiate sex, while women 
have weaker sex drives and are supposed to resist male partners’ 
advances.101 Perpetrators are often unaware that their actions were 
anything other than ordinary and acceptable behavior for seducing 
women.102 
A recent study demonstrates the connection between social norms 
promoting male aggression and female passivity and the pervasive 
 
 96. See NICOLA GAVEY, JUST SEX?: THE CULTURAL SCAFFOLDING OF RAPE 35 (Jane 
Ussher ed., 2005); HARDING, supra note 17, at 1, 6; Rape Culture, BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF SOCIOLOGY (George Ritzer ed., 2007); TRANSFORMING A RAPE CULTURE pmbl. (Emilie 
Buchwald, Pamela Fletcher & Martha Roth eds., 2005); see also Dan Subotnick, “Hands Off”: 
Sex, Feminism, Affirmative Consent, and the Law of Foreplay, 16 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 
249, 252 (2007) (discussing the concept of “rape culture”); Emily Suran, Title IX and Social Media: 
Going Beyond the Law, 21 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 273, 277–78 (2014) (discussing the history of 
the term “rape culture”). 
 97. See SHIFTING THE PARADIGM, supra note 85, at 7, 10; TRANSFORMING A RAPE 
CULTURE, supra note 96, at 1. 
 98. Elizabeth Lopatto, Rape Culture Is a Public Health Issue, FORBES (May 24, 2014), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/elizabethlopatto/2014/05/24/rape-culture-is-a-public-health-issue/#13cc0c2
ac7c1 [https://perma.cc/7MDJ-TS2E]; see also Filipovic, supra note 85, at 18–19 (arguing that 
society sees sex as something that men “do” to women); Hipp et al., supra note 84, at 5 (describing 
attitudes that lead to rape, including the view of women as objects that exist for sexual 
gratification); id. at 6 (describing sexual scripts that contribute to victim blaming and the 
objectification of and hostility toward women as components of “what some would describe as 
rape culture”). 
 99. See SHIFTING THE PARADIGM, supra note 85, at 7; Denise A. Hines, Predictors of Sexual 
Coercion Against Women and Men: A Multilevel, Multinational Study of University Students, 36 
ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAV. 403, 416–18 (2007); Hipp et al., supra note 84, at 2.  
 100. See Hipp et al., supra note 84, at 2; Perry, supra note 86, at 201–02. 
 101. See Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, supra note 17, at 674–75; Hipp et al., supra note 84, at 
4, 6; Perry, supra note 86, at 201–02. 
 102. See Baker, What Rape Is, supra note 17, at 234–35; Perry, supra note 86, at 202. 
KAPLAN IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2017  9:25 AM 
1066  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1045 
acceptance of using force to obtain sex. The study reported nearly one-
third of men surveyed stated that they intended to use force to achieve 
sex.103 Yet the majority of these men expressed that they had no 
intention to “rape a woman,” indicating that most men who force 
women into sex do not view it as rape.104 These men did not 
demonstrate high levels of hostility toward women.105 Instead, they 
demonstrated high levels of attitudes objectifying women and 
embraced the idea that men should exhibit sexual dominance over 
women.106 To them, using force to obtain intercourse was not an act of 
rape, but rather an expression of masculinity and accomplishment.107 
Based on their findings, researchers hypothesized that these men might 
perceive women’s “no” as token resistance consistent with gender 
norms and consider force as an acceptable means to achieve sex.108 
An even more recent study examines anonymous online content 
to demonstrate how these norms contribute to rape. In 2012, 
Reddit.com asked individuals in its community who had committed 
rape to discuss their motivations, thoughts, and feelings about the 
encounters.109 The responses later became the basis for a qualitative 
study on rape.110 One man explained why he persisted with sex despite 
his partner’s verbal protest: “At the time I had this impression that girls 
didn’t want to be seen as sluts or whores so they would pretend that 
they didn’t want to have sex when really they did.”111 Another similarly 
described misjudging his partner’s desire and assuming she was 
engaging in token resistance: “I was horny and I misjudged the girl 
completely, thought she was just being reserved.”112 Another 
anonymous poster described overcoming his girlfriend’s verbal and 
physical resistance through persistent badgering.113 He did not realize 
that she felt violated until he discovered her crying in another room.114 
 
 103. Sarah R. Edwards, Kathryn A. Bradshaw & Verlin B. Hinsz, Denying Rape but 
Endorsing Forceful Intercourse: Exploring Differences Among Responders, 1 VIOLENCE & 
GENDER 188, 190 (2014). 
 104. See id. 
 105. See id. at 191–92. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id.  
 108. See id.  
 109. See Hipp et al., supra note 84, at 1. 
 110. See id. 
 111. Id. at 4. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. 
 114. Id. 
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He acknowledged some responsibility, but also insisted that she 
maintained some degree of responsibility for not resisting him 
sufficiently.115 
Such widely accepted norms restrict the ability of rape reform to 
have meaningful impact. They entrench ideas that a woman who is not 
fighting has consented, regardless of her words or other actions, and 
that a man who persists regardless of a woman’s protests or frozen 
submission has acted reasonably.116 When a woman does not fit the 
paradigm of the chaste and resistant rape victim, judges and juries 
interpreting terms like “force” and “consent” are likely to dismiss 
charges.117 
Assumptions about gender roles and sex also hinder the 
prosecution of rape that does not fit the male-perpetrator/female-
victim paradigm. The myth that men always want sex makes it difficult 
for male rape victims to receive justice.118 Men who are raped by 
women are nearly invisible in the criminal justice system and legal 
scholarship.119 Men who are raped by other men also find their claims 
ignored.120 This is particularly true if the victims are queer; the 
perception of gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender men and women as 
 
 115. See id. 
 116. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 1–2; Estrich, supra note 12, at 1093; see also Baker, 
Sex, Rape, and Shame, supra note 17, at 683–84 (noting the prevalence of notions that, once a 
woman “entice[s]” a man, the man is absolved of guilt for failing to control his sexual urges); 
Gruber, supra note 11, at 630–33 (discussing cultural norms that treat sex, especially with an 
initially reluctant woman, as a victory); MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 650 (describing the ways in 
which dominance has become eroticized and that women are socialized to be passive recipients); 
Pineau, supra note 43, at 222 (discussing the ways in which sexual assault is portrayed as 
“masterful seduction” and submission as enjoyment). 
 117. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 1–2; Gruber, supra note 11, at 600; cf. Estrich, supra 
note 12, at 1093 (noting cultural norms perpetuating the view that males should be aggressive 
about sex and females should be passive about it); MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 650 (discussing 
the ways in which rape has become equated with force, even though the lack of force does not 
always indicate consent, and the presence of force does not always indicate a lack of consent); 
Pineau, supra note 43, at 222 (highlighting the difficulties of separating assault from seduction 
given modern social norms). 
 118. See Michelle Davies & Paul Rogers, Perceptions of Male Victims in Depicted Sexual 
Assaults: A Review of the Literature, 11 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 367, 372 (2006); see 
also Filipovic, supra note 85, at 22 (noting that rape victims are almost always portrayed as 
women, which leaves men out of the narrative); Shayo Buchanan, supra note 64, at 1633–41 
(highlighting that, even though the discourse of prison rapes focuses on sexual abuse perpetrated 
by men, men in prison report higher rates of victimization by female staff than male staff). 
 119. See Davies & Rogers, supra note 118, at 372; see also Shayo Buchanan, supra note 64, at 
1633–41, 1667–72 (focusing on prison rape).  
 120. See generally Capers, supra note 32 (discussing the silence surrounding male-victim 
rape). 
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hypersexual clashes with any notion that their sexual interactions could 
be nonconsensual.121 
These social norms continue to shape the practice of criminal law, 
even where the statutes explicitly reject them. Social norms shape 
juries’ interpretations of the facts, a process known as “cultural 
cognition.”122 Cultural cognition influences the significance that juries 
apply to particular facts.123 In nearly every rape case, juries must infer 
facts where evidence is unclear or disputed and determine which facts 
are most relevant in light of the legal standard. For example, a juror 
must determine whether the defendant used “force” where the victim 
testifies that she was choked and the defendant testifies that he merely 
caressed her.124 A jury must interpret whether a woman who whispered 
“no” expressed nonconsent where a defendant maintains that she did 
so while “amorously” and “passionately” moaning and responding to 
his advances.125  
These issues are particularly germane to establishing a 
defendant’s mens rea. The common belief that men should be sexually 
aggressive and women offer token resistance encourages jurors to give 
credit to a defendant’s alleged honest mistake that his partner 
consented.126 Recklessness and negligence similarly integrate social 
norms and cultural cognition because they instruct jurors to consider 
what is reasonable behavior during sex and what is a gross deviation 
from that behavior.127 The very notion of reasonableness—of what a 
reasonable person would do in the defendant’s shoes—is inextricably 
intertwined with concepts of what we expect of men and women in 
sexual interactions.128 A juror’s conception of social roles, gender 
norms, and sexual interactions is therefore critical to these 
 
 121. See id. at 1269.  
 122. See Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and the Reasonable Person, 14 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 1455, 1457–58 (2010); Kahan, supra note 37, at 732, 755–56. 
 123. See Kahan, supra note 37, at 755–56. 
 124. See Rusk v. State, 406 A.2d 624, 627–28 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979) (en banc), rev’d, 424 
A.2d 720 (Md. 1981); WERTHEIMER, supra note 12, at 21 (discussing the issue of whether Rusk 
had used “force” according to the statute’s requirements); Estrich, supra note 12, at 1112–15 
(discussing force in the context of Rusk).  
 125. See Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1341 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (per curiam), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994); Kahan, supra note 37, at 738–40. 
 126. See Baker, supra note 3, at 230–31; Estrich, supra note 12, at 1095; Filipovic, supra note 
85, at 20. 
 127. For a discussion of social norms, see infra Part I.B.2. 
 128. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 259; Husak & Thomas, supra note 46, at 101–10.  
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determinations.129 A juror interrogating the reasonableness of a 
defendant’s actions may well ask himself what he would have done.130 
The common belief that “no” is simply token resistance to open up 
“negotiations” will lead juries to dismiss charges against a man who 
ignores a woman’s “no.”131 
Cultural cognition is perhaps the most important determinant of 
how a juror will interpret the facts and law in these circumstances—
even more important than the letter of the law. Dan Kahan’s seminal 
study of cultural cognition in rape verdicts demonstrates this effect.132 
In a mock-juror experiment, subjects read a detailed fact pattern 
modeled on Pennsylvania’s Commonwealth v. Berkowitz133 case.134 In 
Berkowitz, the victim and defendant were college students who had 
socialized previously.135 The victim had consumed a martini and was in 
 
 129. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 259; Husak & Thomas, supra note 46, at 101–10. 
 130. See Husak & Thomas, supra note 53, at 88–89. 
 131. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 259–60; Baker, supra note 3, at 246; Dripps, supra 
note 13, at 1804.  
 132. See generally Kahan, supra note 37 (discussing cultural cognition and its interaction with 
rape law). 
 133. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (per curiam), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).  
 134. Subjects in the study were randomly assigned to one of five groups. One group was given 
no definition of rape, while the rest were given definitions of rape that extended over a significant 
range, including a standard that required force, nonconsent, and mens rea; a strict “no means no” 
standard requiring conviction if the defendant heard the word “no”; and a “yes means yes” 
standard defining consent as “words or overt actions indicating a freely given agreement to have 
sexual intercourse.” See Kahan, supra note 37, at 767–69. Specifically, the jurors were given a 
definition that required: (1) force (or the threat thereof), lack of consent, and a minimum mens 
rea akin to negligence; (2) force (or the threat thereof), lack of consent, but no mens rea 
requirement; (3) only lack of consent, defined as “words or overt actions indicating a freely given 
agreement to have sexual intercourse”; or (4) lack of consent, including a scenario “if the woman 
communicated by actions or words, including the word ‘no’ that she did not consent to sexual 
intercourse” and rejects a mistaken belief in consent if the defendant “knows that the woman has 
said ‘no.’” Id.  
 Across conditions, jurors were somewhat split on whether to convict, with 57 percent in 
favor of a guilty verdict and 43 percent in favor of acquittal. Id. at 774. Groups that were given no 
definition and those that were given a common law definition were both only slightly more willing 
to convict than acquit. Id. at 774–75. Both the affirmative consent or “no means no” standards 
increased the percentage willing to convict moderately, from 53 percent to the low-to-mid sixties. 
Id. A substantial portion of jurors therefore voted to acquit even in a jurisdiction where the law 
required conviction if the defendant heard a “no” and the defendant admitted to hearing the 
victim repeatedly say “no” and express her desire to leave. Jurors were similarly convinced that 
the victim provided “words or overt actions indicating a freely given agreement to have sexual 
intercourse.” Id. at 768–69, 774–75. 
 135. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1339. 
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the defendant’s room on her way to meet her boyfriend.136 The 
defendant kissed her, straddled her, and fondled her, to which she 
replied “no” and that she had to meet her boyfriend.137 She repeatedly 
said “no” and emphasized that she had to leave while the defendant 
undid his pants and tried to put his penis in her mouth. He then pushed 
her lightly onto the bed, straddled her, removed her sweatpants and 
underwear, and penetrated her while she said “no.”138 The victim stated 
that she did not physically resist or scream, and that, because the 
defendant was on top of her, she “couldn’t like go anywhere” and “[i]t 
was like a dream was happening or something.”139 While it was 
undisputed that the victim said “no” repeatedly throughout the 
encounter, the defendant argued that she whispered it while 
“amorously” and “passionately” moaning, which he took to be acts of 
encouragement.140  
The experiment found that social norms about male persistence 
and female resistance clearly influenced juror decisions.141 A large 
majority of all respondents, 72 percent, agreed that “[b]y saying ‘no’ 
several times, [the victim] made it clear to [the defendant] that she did 
not consent to sexual intercourse.”142 Yet, 66 percent “also agreed that 
‘if [the victim] had really meant not to consent to sexual intercourse’ 
she ‘would have tried to push [the defendant] off of her’” and 63 
percent agreed that if she really meant not to consent she “would have 
tried to leave the dormitory room.”143 Despite the majority believing 
the victim made her nonconsent clear, the respondents were not 
convinced that the defendant had a culpable mens rea. Sixty-three 
percent agreed that the defendant “believed that [the victim] 
consented to sexual intercourse” and 46 percent agreed that “[g]iven 
all the circumstances, it would have been reasonable for [the 
defendant] to believe [the victim] consented to sexual intercourse.”144 
Thus, despite crediting the victim’s repeated “no,” jurors were 
 
 136. Id. at 1339–40. 
 137. Id. at 1340.  
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 1341.  
 141. See Kahan, supra note 37, at 794 (“The evidence supports the hypothesis, then, that 
individuals are motivated to form perceptions of fact that assure a congenial relationship between 
the expressive judgment of the law and the norms these persons use to evaluate the character of 
the parties in an alleged acquaintance-rape scenario.”). 
 142. Id. at 783 (first alteration in original). 
 143. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting survey language). 
 144. Id.  
KAPLAN IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2017  9:25 AM 
2017] RAPE BEYOND CRIME 1071 
ambivalent about whether this truly constituted nonconsent absent 
physical resistance. They were also unconvinced that the defendant 
had a knowing or even negligent mens rea as to nonconsent. 
But perhaps most startling was that cultural cognition exerted the 
strongest influence over a juror’s likelihood to convict—stronger even 
than the letter of the law. Those who were more inclined to embrace 
hierarchical social orders that feature differentiation and stratification 
of social roles (including traditional gender roles) were far more likely 
to acquit the defendant than those with more egalitarian worldviews, 
regardless of the legal definition.145 Statistical analysis demonstrated 
that these cultural views had a stronger impact on a juror’s likelihood 
to convict or acquit than the legal definition of rape.146 They also 
exerted a stronger influence than gender, age, income, education, 
religion, or political-party affiliation.147 
Cultural views also exerted a strong influence on jurors’ 
perceptions of the facts. A hierarchical worldview produced a pro-
defendant view of the facts, with jurors being more likely to find that 
“[d]espite what she said or might have felt after, [the victim] really did 
consent to sexual intercourse”; an egalitarian world view produced a 
more antidefendant view of the facts.148 In contrast, legal definitions 
exerted minimal influence on jurors’ perceptions of the facts. Legal 
definitions exerted influence only on jurors assigned to the strict “no 
means no” definition. However, given the facts of the case—in which 
it was undisputed that the victim said “no” and that the defendant 
heard it—this influence was surprisingly modest; the proportion of 
subjects who agreed that the defendant was guilty of rape increased by 
only 10 percent.149 This suggests that even a strict “no means no” 
definition can be swallowed by the effect of cultural dispositions, 
particularly in communities where a hierarchical worldview 
dominates.150 
In sum, cultural norms severely undermine the effectiveness of 
rape law in a way that criminal law reform cannot fix. Moves toward 
more progressive laws, including “yes means yes” affirmative-consent 
 
 145. See id. at 781–82. 
 146. See id. at 780–83; 798–99.  
 147. See id. at 779 tbl.1, 782–83. Gender exerted meaningful effects only in conjunction with 
culture; its effect was to make women who embraced more traditional, hierarchical values less 
likely to convict than men with similar values. See id.  
 148. Id. at 787. 
 149. See id. at 796. 
 150. See id. 
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standards, will still be subverted by the influence of cultural norms. 
Effective prosecution of rape requires a more fundamental change—a 
shift in the underlying norms that perpetuate the use of force and 
coercion in sex and that encourage partners to ignore each other’s 
desires and boundaries. 
2. Social Norms Are Intrinsic to the Mens Rea Determination.  The 
problems raised in the previous Section cannot be solved simply by 
encouraging juries to ignore dominant social norms. Not only will juries 
take social norms into account in rape cases but, to some extent, they 
must. Social and cultural norms are integral to the determination of 
whether a defendant had a culpable mens rea. Ignoring them would 
therefore mete out punishment disproportionate to a defendant’s 
culpability.151 
A common criticism of rape law is that it focuses on the 
perspective of the defendant and ignores that of the victim.152 Yet this 
focus is understandable and necessary in the context of mens rea. Mens 
rea requires the jury to examine the defendant’s perspective and the 
facts available to him and determine whether he had a specific mental 
state as to nonconsent.153 
This is perhaps clearest where the prosecution must prove a mens 
rea of knowledge. As long as the defendant’s belief was honest, even 
an unreasonable belief that his partner consented to the sexual act 
would not satisfy a mens rea of knowledge. During a sexual interaction, 
partners rely on cues from each other to determine consent or lack 
thereof.154 An individual will look to the context of the interaction and 
surrounding circumstances, his own actions, and his partner’s actions 
in order to determine whether his partner is consenting. Social norms 
and cultural cognition influence how defendants interpret these cues.155 
 
 151. Sometimes laws are by nature overinclusive and criminalize activities that are not 
culpable. But such exceptions should be rare and undertaken only after critical analysis. See 
Margo Kaplan, Rethinking HIV-Exposure Crimes, 87 IND. L.J. 1517, 1555–56 (2012).  
 152. See HARDING, supra note 17, at 4; MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 652–54; see also 
SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 257 (discussing resentment among feminists stemming from the 
defendant-focused nature of rape law). 
 153. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 257. See generally Ben-David, supra note 52, at 444–
45 (discussing the mens rea requirement in rape as it relates to non-consent). 
 154. See Husak & Thomas, supra note 46, at 101–10. 
 155. See id.; Kahan, supra note 37, at 750; see also SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 257–60 
(examining the role of social norms in defendants’ perception of victims’ cues); Filipovic, supra 
note 85, at 20 (same). 
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They are therefore critical to determining whether a defendant had the 
requisite mens rea. 
Unfortunately, dominant social norms discourage partners from 
reading cues of nonconsent. Men are socialized to view sex with 
women—even reluctant women—as a victory to be achieved.156 They 
are taught to dismiss or ignore a woman’s signs of nonconsent and to 
perceive neutral or negative cues as indicators of either consent or an 
invitation to persuasion.157 Studies show that men commonly 
misunderstand women’s actions and perceive sexual interest where 
there is none.158 Meanwhile, our culture encourages men to persuade, 
coerce, or badger women who hesitate or resist rather than recognize 
that the need for these tactics is indicative of nonconsent.159 They are 
also taught to infer future consent from past sexual consent.160 
Social conventions for women also increase the likelihood of 
miscommunication.161 Women are repeatedly taught to be polite, to 
equivocate, hide their feelings, and even simply “go through with sex” 
rather than outright reject advances in a way that leads to a 
confrontation.162 Women are also encouraged to hesitate even if they 
want sex, and to feign resistance in order to seem as though they have 
been persuaded.163 Male consent is rarely a consideration; women are 
 
 156. See Baker, supra note 3, at 230, 247; Filipovic, supra note 85, at 19–20; Gruber, supra note 
11, at 631. 
 157. See Baker, supra note 3, at 230–31, 246–47; Dripps, supra note 13, at 1804; Gruber, supra 
note 11, at 631–32; Husak & Thomas, supra note 53, at 94–96, 98–100; MacKinnon, supra  
note 30, at 652–54; Jeanna Bryner, Clueless Guys Can’t Read Women, LIVESCIENCE (Mar. 19,  
2008), http://www.livescience.com/4876-clueless-guys-read-women.html [https://perma.cc/5XH4-
BX5B]; see also Martie G. Haselton, The Sexual Overperception Bias: Evidence of a Systematic 
Bias in Men from a Survey of Naturally Occurring Events, 37 J. RES. PERSONALITY 34, 39–45 
(2003) (providing research results on men’s tendency to perceive women’s sexual interest where 
there is none, and the connection with Western media); 
 158. See Baker, supra note 3, at 231; Dripps, supra note 13, at 1804; Gruber, supra note 11, at 
631–32; Haselton, supra note 157, 39–45; Husak & Thomas, supra note 53, at 94–96, 98–100; 
MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 652–54. 
 159. See Baker, supra note 3, at 230–31, 234, 246–47; Gruber, supra note 11, at 631–32; Kahan, 
supra note 37, at 746. 
 160. See Dripps, supra note 13, at 1801. 
 161. See Baker, supra note 3, at 230–31, 246; Gruber, supra note 11, at 632–33. 
 162. Gruber, supra note 11, at 632–33 (internal quotations omitted); see Baker, supra note 3, 
at 230–31, 246; see also Hipp et al., supra note 84, at 4 (describing a perpetrator who assumed his 
partner was putting up token resistance “because of the playful/giggly nature” of the way she said 
“no, I can’t”). 
 163. See Gruber, supra note 11, at 632–33. 
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taught that men are inherently pleasure-seeking beings who always 
crave sex.164 
These stereotypes and social norms can influence whether a 
defendant formed the requisite mens rea of knowledge. A defendant 
who truly believes that his partner’s silence was indicative of consent, 
rather than fear or shock, does not have the mens rea of knowledge as 
to nonconsent. Nor does a defendant who honestly believed that his 
coercion was welcome seduction.165 While none of these mistaken 
beliefs make the victim any less harmed, they do affect the defendant’s 
culpability. If a statute requires the mens rea of knowledge, these 
mistakes will, and often do, prevent conviction.166 
Legislatures may avoid some of these concerns by requiring a less 
culpable mens rea, such as recklessness.167 Though recklessness does 
not require a defendant to be aware of nonconsent itself, it does require 
a certain awareness of the risk of nonconsent.168 A defendant with an 
honest but mistaken belief that his partner consented is nonetheless 
reckless if he was aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that he 
was mistaken. For example, a defendant who hears his partner say “no” 
but decides he can convince her otherwise is aware of a risk that his 
partner is not consenting—he simply chooses to ignore this risk.169 He 
may do so because he is indifferent to his partner’s consent, or he may 
honestly believe that—despite the risk otherwise—his partner is 
consenting. But if the risk he was aware of rises to the level of 
“substantial and unjustifiable,” even an honest belief in his partner’s 
consent does not exculpate him.170 
 
 164. See supra Part I.B.1; see infra Part II.C.3. 
 165. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 257; Filipovic, supra note 85, at 20. 
 166. See MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 652–53 (“[W]omen are also violated every day by men 
who have no idea of the meaning of their acts to women. To them, it is sex. Therefore, to the law, 
it is sex.”).  
 167. Some scholars and state laws instead focus on whether the defendant’s mistaken belief 
about consent was reasonable. See, e.g., Bryden, supra note 30, at 326–29; Husak & Thomas, supra 
note 53, at 101. It is more appropriate to focus instead on whether a mistaken defendant was 
nonetheless reckless or negligent. The relevant questions are not whether his mistake is 
reasonable but whether he nonetheless had a culpable mental state such as recklessness or 
negligence. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1985); Alexander, supra note 59, at 
310. 
 168. See Ben-David, supra note 52, at 444–45. 
 169. But see ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 52, at 25–65 (arguing that we could fold both 
purpose and knowledge into the mens rea of recklessness).  
 170. See Alexander, supra note 59, at 310. 
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Yet cultural cognition and social norms may still prevent a 
defendant from forming a reckless mental state. Social norms and 
commonly accepted stereotypes about sex and gender often discourage 
partners, in particular men, from perceiving the risk of nonconsent.171 
The belief that silence equals consent, for example, may prevent a man 
from even perceiving the risk of nonconsent. In many contexts—such 
as when a woman has indicated interest in him or sex—it also 
encourages him to perceive her verbal rejection as playful banter or 
token resistance to be overcome by seduction. These misperceptions 
are, of course, context specific; different scenarios will influence how 
an individual perceives his partner’s actions. Overestimating a 
woman’s sexual interest influences the defendant’s ability to form the 
mens rea of knowledge as well as the awareness of risk necessary for 
the mens rea of recklessness.172 
Where the defendant is aware of a risk his partner is not 
consenting, recklessness requires that the risk he perceives be both 
substantial and unjustifiable.173 In general, a risk is considered 
substantial and unjustifiable if the defendant’s choice to disregard it 
was a “gross deviation from the standard of conduct” that a reasonable 
person would observe in his situation.174 This standard assesses the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct using both subjective and 
objective standards. The jury must consider the defendant’s “situation” 
as well as “the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the 
circumstances known to him” and then assess his conduct using a 
reasonable person standard.175 
A reasonable person determination is in large part dependent on 
dominant social norms and cultural attitudes.176 It looks to the ordinary 
 
 171. See MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 653 (“[M]en are systematically conditioned not even 
to notice what women want. They may have not a glimmer of women’s indifference or 
revulsion.”). 
 172. See supra note 157. 
 173. For a discussion of the concepts of “substantial and unjustifiable,” see JOEL FEINBERG, 
HARM TO OTHERS 187–93 (1984); Kaplan, supra note 151, at 1539–40; Paul H. Robinson, 
Prohibited Risks and Culpable Disregard or Inattentiveness: Challenge and Confusion in the 
Formulation of Risk-Creation Offenses, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 367, 372–77 (2003). 
 174. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1985); Robinson, supra note 173, at 
377. 
 175. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02; Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal 
Culpability, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1377–79 (1992); Robinson, supra note 173, at 386–87. 
 176. See Braman, supra note 122, at 1468–80; Husak & Thomas, supra note 46, at 103–08. 
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person of average intelligence.177 In the context of rape, the ordinary 
person’s perspective is forged in a culture that “systematically 
condition[s]” men to either not see, underestimate, or ignore signs of 
nonconsent, that conditions women to equivocate, and that teaches 
both sexes that token resistance is common.178 It is one thing to reject 
a defendant’s perspective, but quite another to say that it grossly 
deviates from the standard of a reasonable person when over half of 
college men surveyed reported that women mean “yes” when they say 
“no.”179 As Katharine Baker notes, “Men, understandably, confuse 
women’s passivity for consent because many men know that women 
can be passive even when they want to consent to sex. Men believe that 
women say no when they mean yes.”180 
Similar problems arise even where the law requires mere 
negligence as to nonconsent.181 A defendant is criminally negligent 
where his failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk was a 
gross deviation from the standard of conduct of a reasonable person in 
the defendant’s situation.182 Unlike recklessness, a mens rea of 
negligence can allow a guilty verdict even where the defendant was 
unaware of the risk of nonconsent. It determines the defendant’s guilt 
 
 177. See Samuel Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 105, 122 (1996); see 
also MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. at 242 (AM LAW INST., Official Draft 
and Revised Comments 1985) (stating that “the heredity, intelligence, or temperament of the 
actor would not be held material in judging negligence and could not be without depriving the 
criterion of all its objectivity”). 
 178. See MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 652–54. 
 179. See Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, supra note 17, at 668; see also Kahan, supra note 37, at 
750–51 (arguing that if we interpret ignoring a woman’s words as de facto unreasonable and 
sufficient for liability, we will unjustly convict men who are acting reasonably and in good faith 
according to society’s conventions); MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 643 (stating that men who rape 
are “expressing the images of masculinity . . . for which they are otherwise trained, elevated, 
venerated, and paid”). 
 180. See Baker, supra note 3, at 246. 
 181. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 258 (discussing the negligence requirement for rape); 
Bryden, supra note 30, at 330 (same); see also ESTRICH, supra note 14, at 96–104 (proposing a 
negligence standard for rape). 
 182. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 1985); see also SCHULHOFER, supra 
note 12, at 258 (describing the negligence requirement for rape). Negligence may be the strongest 
weapon for prosecutors, because, despite its reliance on social conventions, it does bring in the 
widest swath of conduct. But it is a genuine problem if criminal law must lean on negligence 
because of the mens rea problems that cultural and social norms create. There is legitimate debate 
about its use in criminal law. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 52, at 70–71; SCHULHOFER, 
supra note 12, at 258–59; Husak & Thomas, supra note 46, at 98–99. See generally Kenneth W. 
Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory: The Problem of Criminal Negligence, 5 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 365 (1994) (examining the propriety of negligence liability in criminal law). 
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based not on what he knew, but what he should have known.183 Yet, as 
with recklessness, a negligence mens rea requires the jury to consider 
social and cultural norms in determining whether the defendant’s 
failure to perceive the risk of his partner’s nonconsent grossly deviates 
from a reasonable person standard.184 
This is not to argue that our dominant social norms are correct. 
On the contrary, they reflect deeply troubling stereotypes and 
attitudes. But the fact that these norms are so widely accepted and 
ingrained necessarily affects whether a defendant’s mental state is 
considered to be knowing, reckless, or negligent. As long as these 
remain the dominant social norms, jurors will be both unwilling and 
logically unable to find a defendant to be culpable in many cases.185 
These obstacles, however, are not insurmountable. This Article 
argues that the law has a critical role to play in combating the cultural 
norms that encourage forced, coerced, and unwanted sex. Our mistake 
has been to focus primarily (indeed, almost exclusively) on criminal law 
to effect this change. Part II argues that public health law provides a 
far better framework to meet rape’s challenges. 
 
 183. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02; ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 52, at 70–71; Ben-
David, supra note 52, at 446–57. 
 184. Rape therefore raises a uniquely fundamental problem when it comes to the reasonable 
person. Case law and scholarship often debate whether juries should consider an individual’s 
minority culture or idiosyncratic views when determining whether his actions were reasonable. 
See, e.g., R. Lee Strasburger, Jr., The Best Interests of the Child?: The Cultural Defense as 
Justification for Child Abuse, 25 PACE INT’L L. REV. 161, 162 (2013) (discussing a cultural defense 
in the context of determining what reasonable punishment is for child abuse). But rape law need 
not even reach this question to face thorny mens rea issues. In rape law, the problem is not merely 
a minority view, but rather the standard set by the dominant culture and the average person.  
 185. This problem cannot be neatly ignored by simply holding defendants to a higher standard 
of reasonableness. The recklessness and negligence standards require a “gross deviation” from 
the standard of conduct of a reasonable person. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02. A person who 
acts in accordance with society’s conventions is not, by definition, grossly deviating from those 
norms. The individual’s actions may certainly be harmful and morally wrong. But they 
nonetheless may not meet the mental state requirements for recklessness or negligence. We 
cannot ignore the requirements for culpability when they do not suit us. See Kahan, supra note 
37, at 750–51.  
 Nor is this issue easily resolved by redrafting the definition of consent. Statutes with a 
narrow definition of consent can reduce the role of mens rea: for example, a rape law may be 
drafted in which a victim’s “no” must always equal nonconsent, and all that matters is whether 
the defendant had a culpable mens rea as to the word “no.” But reducing consent to a hard-and-
fast rule has more drawbacks than benefits. Most notably, its lack of nuance would make it 
substantially over- and underinclusive. For example, victims commonly do not utter “no,” but 
instead freeze or remain silent.  
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II.  RAPE BEYOND CRIME: A PUBLIC HEALTH LAW FRAMEWORK 
A. The Power, Mandate, and Characteristics of Public Health Law 
Public health law consists of the state’s power and duties to assure 
conditions for people to be healthy.186 Within this area are several 
defining characteristics germane to rape’s unique challenges, most 
notably its (1) focus on the state’s power to ensure health; (2) broad 
scope, which allows it to integrate several other areas of law; (3) use of 
partnerships with communities and multiple public and private 
institutions; (4) focus on populations, as opposed to individuals; (5) 
prevention-oriented mandate; and (6) requirement that interventions 
be evidence based.187 This Section will describe these characteristics 
and how they form a powerful legal framework to achieve a broad set 
of public health goals. 
The meaning of public health has changed significantly over the 
past century. Traditionally, public health law focused on the prevention 
of disease.188 Infectious diseases, however, are no longer the leading 
causes of death, ceding that role to chronic diseases, accidental causes, 
and violence.189 As the most common causes of death and injury have 
changed, so has the concept of public health. The World Health 
Organization’s (WHO) definition of health, adopted by the CDC, is “a 
state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not just 
the absence of sickness or frailty.”190 
 
 186. See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN & PETER D. JACOBSON, LAW AND THE HEALTH SYSTEM 12 
(2006); Lawrence O. Gostin, A Theory and Definition of Public Health Law, 10 J. HEALTH CARE 
L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2007); Pamela M. McMahon, The Public Health Approach to the Prevention of 
Sexual Violence, 12 SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 27, 28 (2000). 
 187. See GOSTIN & JACOBSON, supra note 186, at 14–17; Gostin, supra note 186, at 1. 
 188. See GOSTIN & JACOBSON, supra note 186, at 16; Camille M. Davidson, What’s Love Got 
to Do with It?: Examining Domestic Violence as a Public Health Issue Using Their Eyes Were 
Watching God, 81 UMKC L. REV. 867, 893 (2013). The seminal 1905 case of Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, for example, upholds state power to mandate vaccination. Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27–30 (1905). 
 189. See Davidson, supra note 188, at 893; Wendy K. Mariner, Law and Public Health: Beyond 
Emergency Preparedness, 38 J. HEALTH L. 247, 258−61 (2005). Demographic breakdowns reveal 
disparities in causes of death. For example, homicide is the fifth leading cause of death among 
black men and the leading cause of death among black men ages fifteen to thirty-four. See CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, LEADING CAUSES OF DEATH BY AGE GROUP, 
RACE/ETHNICITY, MALES (2013), http://www.cdc.gov/men/lcod/2013/race_ethnicitymen2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R27A-T3RL]; CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, LEADING 
CAUSES OF DEATH BY AGE GROUP, BLACK MALES—UNITED STATES 1 (2013), 
http://www.cdc.gov/men/lcod/2013/blackmales2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WTU-JRLY].  
 190. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, supra note 7, at 1.  
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Public health law has responded by shifting its focus from 
responding to epidemics to creating conditions and promoting 
behaviors that enable populations to achieve this broader definition of 
health.191 This mandate requires public health law to use a broad range 
of legal interventions. Chronic disease, violence, and accidental injury 
involve multiple risk factors, and, unlike many infectious diseases, 
there is no single intervention likely to prevent or cure them.192 Instead, 
they require the coordination of several different laws, policies, and 
systems.193 
Public health law is therefore not cabined in a solitary category, 
but rather extends its reach into several areas of law. While many states 
have public health codes, nearly any type of law can be a public health 
law. As one commenter noted, public health law “might be equated 
with any public policy that serves in any way to prevent physical or 
mental harm or to maintain and improve health.”194 Public health laws 
include, for example, education laws that mandate HIV-prevention 
information in health classes; environmental laws that improve air 
quality; employment laws that require safe working conditions; federal 
laws regulating the insurance market; laws that regulate firearm use 
and ownership; and criminal laws that prohibit driving while 
intoxicated. 
The government has broad powers to enact these laws. A state’s 
police power gives it the authority to pass public health laws ranging 
from mandatory quarantine and vaccination to seatbelt use and water 
fluoridation requirements, to workplace standards and educational 
programs.195 Congress may pass public health laws using its power of 
the purse, its power to tax, or its power under the Commerce Clause.196 
 
 191. See GOSTIN & JACOBSON, supra note 186, at 22−25, 41−42 (discussing debates over the 
scope of public health); Davidson, supra note 188, at 893 (describing the evolution of public health 
law from its focus on disease eradication to its broader focus on promoting healthier lifestyles); 
Gostin, supra note 186, at 6−7 (discussing the importance of social justice to achieve public health 
goals); Mariner, supra note 189, at 258−61 (discussing the shift in attention of American public 
health law from disease eradication to the “full range of social determinants of health”). 
 192. See Mariner, supra note 189, at 258−61. 
 193. See Pamela M. McMahon, The Public Health Approach to the Prevention of Domestic 
Violence, 47 LOY. L. REV. 471, 472 (2001). 
 194. See Mariner, supra note 189, at 252. 
 195. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 (1905); GOSTIN & JACOBSON, supra note 
186, at 13–14, 85; Gostin, supra note 186, at 3–4. 
 196. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578−79 (2012).  
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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)197 and the 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),198 for example, serve 
significant public health objectives. The White House can also create 
task forces to address public health issues under its executive 
authority.199 
Taking on the third characteristic identified above, public health 
law involves partnerships between numerous public, private, and 
community institutions. Unlike criminal law, which is meted out by a 
system specific to it, public health laws are interpreted and enforced by 
a wide range of actors and institutions. Local, state, and national health 
agencies monitor health conditions, assess risk factors, and recommend 
interventions. But they are hardly the only state actors that enforce 
public health law; rather, they act as “focal institutions at the center of 
a multisector ‘public health system.’”200 This system consists of multiple 
state actors, such as public schools that teach health curricula; agencies 
such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration that ensure 
conditions for employee health and safety; environmental agencies 
that monitor environmentally related health risks and compliance with 
regulations; and agencies that enforce laws guaranteeing safe housing 
conditions.201 
Public health law also relies upon partnerships with numerous 
private and nonprofit institutions. Perhaps the most obvious among 
these are health care providers, which collect health information and 
diagnose and treat patients.202 But less well-known are partnerships 
with other private institutions, such as those in the mass media that 
create campaigns to further public health goals. One example is the 
collaboration between the CDC, MTV, the Kaiser Family Foundation, 
and the Planned Parenthood Foundation to create It’s Your (Sex) Life, 
 
 197. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010). 
 198. Violence Against Women Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §§ 40001–703, 108 Stat. 1796, 
1902−55 (1994).  
 199. See, e.g., Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, Establishing a Task Force on Childhood Obesity (Feb.  
9, 2010), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/presidential-memorandum-establishing-a-
task-force-childhood-obesity [https://perma.cc/TJ49-S99E]. 
 200. See Gostin, supra note 186, at 5 (citing INST. OF MED., THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC’S 
HEALTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY 27 (2003)). 
 201. See id. at 5−6. 
 202. See id. at 5. 
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a public-information partnership that has helped increase safe sex 
practices among youth.203 
Public health law also integrates partnerships with community 
organizations such as churches and civic organizations, which are well 
suited to assess community needs and ensure that interventions are 
culturally appropriate.204 Data collection and public health 
interventions are more likely to be successful with the active 
involvement and trust of the community.205 In turn, community 
organizations can use this collaboration to advocate for laws and 
policies that meet the needs of their population.206 
Community engagement underscores the fourth and fifth 
characteristics of public health law: its focus on populations and 
prevention. Public health law abides by the legal maxim salus populi 
est suprema lex, the welfare of the people is the supreme law.207 To this 
end, public health law uses prevention strategies that target 
populations and communities. “Primary prevention,” a cornerstone of 
the public health framework, assesses risk factors and tailors 
interventions to prevent health problems before they manifest.208 It 
addresses the beliefs and norms that lead to problematic behavior, as 
well as social determinants of health such as poverty, racial 
discrimination, and housing.209 
Primary prevention strategies also reflect the final characteristic 
identified above: public health law’s commitment to evidence-based 
laws and policies. In particular, primary prevention strategies must 
define a problem and identify risk factors using in-depth demographic 
collection, including data on the relationships between victims and 
 
 203. See Allison L. Friedman et al., An Assessment of the GYT: Get Yourself Tested 
Campaign: An Integrated Approach to Sexually Transmitted Disease Prevention Communication, 
41 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 151, 151 (2014).  
 204. See Gostin, supra note 186, at 5−6. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See id. 
 207. See GOSTIN & JACOBSON, supra note 186, at 13. 
 208. See SHIFTING THE PARADIGM, supra note 85, at 5, 7; McMahon, supra note 186, at 28 
(noting that primary prevention focuses on stopping problem behavior before it starts). 
 209. See SHIFTING THE PARADIGM, supra note 85, at 5; Davidson, supra note 188, at 894−96; 
Mariner, supra note 189, at 252−54; Jonathan Todres, Moving Upstream: The Merits of a Public 
Health Law Approach to Human Trafficking, 89 N.C. L. REV. 447, 487 (2011). See generally 
SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH (Michael Marmot & Richard G. Wilkinson eds., 2d. ed. 
2005) (exploring social determinants of health).  
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perpetrators.210 Interventions should not only be based on this data, but 
also be tested and continually assessed to ensure effectiveness.211 
This legal framework provides a valuable platform for addressing 
rape. Public health authorities such as the WHO and the CDC have 
long recognized rape and other forms of sexual violence as significant 
public health problems.212 The National Institute of Drug Abuse has 
urged that “it is imperative that rape be classified as a major public 
health issue in the United States.”213 The American College Health 
Association has called sexual violence “a serious campus and public 
health issue,” and has recommended a public health approach based 
on prevention strategies that target the cultural myths that encourage 
rape.214 
Rape’s significance as a public health issue becomes particularly 
stark when its prevalence is compared to other widely accepted public 
health problems. While breast cancer affects about 12 percent of 
women,215 CDC surveys have found that 20 percent of women have 
reported being the victim of rape or attempted rape by force or 
intoxication.216 Thirteen percent of women have reported being victims 
of sexual coercion.217 Nearly 5 percent of men have reported being 
forced to penetrate others, and 6 percent have experienced sexual 
coercion. In comparison, 4.5 percent of men will be diagnosed with 
colorectal cancer—the third most commonly diagnosed cancer and 
third leading cause of cancer death among men.218 
 
 210. See McMahon, supra note 186, at 30; James A. Mercy et al., Public Health Policy for 
Preventing Violence, 12 HEALTH AFF. 7, 15–16 (1993); Todres, supra note 209, at 470–71.  
 211. See McMahon, supra note 186, at 30; Todres, supra note 209, at 470–71. 
 212. See CDC SURVEY, supra note 66, at 1; WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD REPORT ON 
VIOLENCE AND HEALTH 149–64 (2014); see also Schafran, supra note 41, at 15 (discussing 
violence as a public health problem); Todres, supra note 209, at 468–69 (arguing that human 
trafficking, as a form of violence, is a public health issue). Aside from being a public health 
concern in its own right, rape also increases the risk of other physical and mental health problems. 
See CDC SURVEY, supra note 66, at 1, 3, 7; Baker, What Rape Is, supra note 17, at 253–54; 
Schafran, supra note 41, at 15–16. Acquaintance rape may pose a higher risk of psychological 
harm because it impairs a victim’s ability to trust. See Schafran, supra note 41, at 16.  
 213. See Schafran, supra note 41, at 16 (quoting CRIME VICTIM RESEARCH AND TREATMENT 
CTR., RAPE IN AMERICA 13 (1992)). 
 214. See SHIFTING THE PARADIGM, supra note 85, at 5. 
 215. See NAT’L CANCER INST., BREAST CANCER RISK IN AMERICAN WOMEN, http://www.
cancer.gov/types/breast/risk-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/CD2H-JYMP]. 
 216. See CDC SURVEY, supra note 66, at 18. 
 217. Id. at 17–19. 
 218. See NAT’L CANCER INST., SEER STAT FACT SHEETS: COLON AND RECTUM CANCER 
(2016), http://seer.cancer.gov/statfacts/html/colorect.html [https://perma.cc/C43R-SXNB]. 
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Demonstrating that rape is a public health problem, however, 
does not prove that public health law should be the primary legal 
framework through which the law addresses rape. There are several 
areas of law that could provide legal frameworks to address rape, such 
as criminal law (the current dominant approach) and civil law (the 
current supplementary approach, primarily on college campuses). Why 
make public health law the primary framework for rape law? 
The next Section argues that the characteristics of public health 
law described above create a legal framework uniquely well suited to 
tackling the challenges rape poses. Unlike criminal law, public health 
law can engage the complex causes of rape—causes that include 
cultural norms and attitudes as well as social determinants like 
inequality. It can use a more nuanced understanding of rape to create 
evidence-based legal interventions that effectively target rape’s causes. 
These legal interventions are better suited to change behavior than 
criminal law because they can directly address the social norms and 
beliefs that encourage sexual aggression and instead provide positive 
models for sexual behaviors. 
B. Transforming Rape Law: A Public Health Law Framework 
1. An Evidence-Based Approach.  Laws and policies that seek to 
prevent rape must be informed by rape’s causes. Public health law 
provides a powerful framework to meet this challenge, in particular 
because of its focus on population-based prevention.219 Primary 
prevention strategies begin by (1) defining the problem with in-depth 
demographic collection, including data on the relationships between 
victims and perpetrators and (2) identifying risk factors.220 Public 
health laws can use public health surveillance to collect data and 
identify what causes sexual violence in different populations and 
communities.221 
While it may seem passive when compared to criminal law 
deterrents, data collection is critical to an effective legal approach. It 
equips lawmakers with an evidence-based, nuanced understanding of 
 
 219. See Kathleen C. Basile, A Comprehensive Approach to Sexual Violence Prevention, 372 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2350, 2351 (2015); McMahon, supra note 186, at 31; Todres, supra note 209, at 
452.  
 220. See McMahon, supra note 186, at 30; Todres, supra note 209, at 470–71. 
 221. See CDC SURVEY, supra note 66, at 4; McMahon, supra note 186, at 32; Hattie 
Ruttenberg, The Limited Promise of Public Health Methodologies to Prevent Youth Violence, 103 
YALE L.J. 1885, 1889–90 (1994); Todres, supra note 209, at 475. 
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the problem. Public health law can examine causes as diverse as 
community living conditions, economic factors, social messages, and 
peer and family influence.222 In contrast, criminal law’s narrower focus 
on punishment and individual culpability excludes careful 
consideration of the cultural norms and social determinants of criminal 
behavior. 
This nuanced understanding is particularly relevant in the context 
of rape. As discussed in Part I.B, the cultural norms that promote and 
normalize sexual aggression make incidents of rape not only prevalent 
but also extremely difficult to prosecute. Public health law’s focus on 
populations and evidence-based prevention provides a legal 
framework that requires lawmakers to consider how norms, beliefs, 
and social and economic systems promote sexual violence.223 This focus 
on evidence and data collection also helps ensure that rape-prevention 
interventions will be effective in practice.224 Primary prevention 
strategy requires that interventions are tested and proven effective.225 
2. Changing Behaviors by Changing Social Norms.  Rape is also 
particularly suited to a public health law framework because of the way 
that social norms and conventions obscure the problem itself. Other 
offenses, such as assaults and murders, are widely accepted as harmful 
and criminal. Social norms are less likely to thwart their prosecution. 
Public health interventions to prevent violent behavior ask: How can 
we prevent behavior that individuals know is unlawful and harmful? In 
contrast, sexual assault—and acquaintance rape in particular—
concerns behavior that is not widely accepted as criminal or harmful.226 
Criminal law cannot prosecute these offenses effectively absent a 
change in the dominant social norms. A public health approach is 
necessary to bring the harm of this behavior to the public 
consciousness, both for prevention and successful prosecution. 
Public health law interventions, such as education laws and 
policies and media campaigns, can change social norms and attitudes 
that contribute to sexual aggression.227 In particular, they can address 
the social norms that normalize sexual aggression, encourage 
 
 222. See Todres, supra note 209, at 482−84. 
 223. See SHIFTING THE PARADIGM, supra note 85, at 3; Todres, supra note 209, at 452−53, 
483−85.  
 224. See McMahon, supra note 186, at 30; Todres, supra note 209, at 454, 470−71. 
 225. See McMahon, supra note 186, at 30; Todres, supra note 209, at 470−71. 
 226. See supra Part I.B. 
 227. See CDC SURVEY, supra note 66, at 4; Todres, supra note 209, at 487.  
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individuals to ignore cues of nonconsent, and prevent them from 
realizing that their actions may constitute rape.228 As discussed above, 
a substantial number of men admit to using force or coercion during 
sex but do not characterize it as rape—they simply do not see 
themselves as rapists.229 Changing this understanding and behavior 
therefore requires a strong educational component to change attitudes 
about consent and gender roles. These educational components must 
be able to prompt individuals to analyze their own behavior rather than 
simply distinguish themselves as de facto “not rapists.”230  
Public health interventions can also promote positive sexual 
practices, a more effective prevention strategy than merely trying to 
punish undesirable acts.231 Educational programs that teach positive 
social norms and skills have been proven to materially reduce harmful 
behavior. One recent example is Fast Track, a childhood intervention 
for high-risk, aggressive first-grade children that follows them through 
tenth grade.232 Fast Track provides academic tutoring, but is notable 
for its focus on teaching social skills and self-control.233 Studies tracking 
participants into early adulthood show compelling and lasting effects, 
with participants demonstrating significantly lower likelihood of 
violent crime, delinquency, drug-related crime, risky sexual behavior, 
substance abuse, and psychological problems.234 Further research 
credits Fast Track’s emphasis on social skills—teaching participants to 
regulate emotions and respect others—with preventing antisocial 
behavior in general and criminal behavior and arrests in particular.235 
A public health framework can use legal interventions such as 
education laws and policies and media campaigns to change social 
norms and teach skills that prevent sexual aggression and rape. Such 
laws and policies can help the population foster healthy sexual norms 
and stress good sex—sex that involves communication, mutual respect, 
 
 228. For a discussion of these norms, see supra Part I.B. See also Alan D. Berkowitz, Sexual 
Assault Prevention, in 2 MEN AND MASCULINITIES: A SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 719, 719−20 (Michael Kimmel & Amy Aronson eds., 2004). 
 229. See supra notes 103−08 and accompanying text. 
 230. See Edwards et al., supra note 103, at 192.  
 231. See Todres, supra note 209, at 483−84, 489−90. 
 232. Kenneth A. Dodge et al., Impact of Early Intervention on Psychopathology, Crime, and 
Well-being at Age 25, 172 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 59, 59 (2015); Lucy C. Sorensen & Kenneth A. 
Dodge, How Does the Fast Track Intervention Prevent Adverse Outcomes in Young Adulthood?, 
87 CHILD DEV. 429, 429−30 (2016). 
 233. Sorensen & Dodge, supra note 232, at 430. 
 234. See Dodge et al., supra note 232, at 65, 67; Sorensen & Dodge, supra note 232, at 432. 
 235. Sorensen & Dodge, supra note 232, at 432, 442. 
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and mutual pleasure.236 It can help children, teenagers, and adults 
identify and reject the gender stereotypes that lead to the denigration 
of women, everyday sexism and objectification of women, and victim 
blaming in the context of sexual aggression.237 It can teach skills and 
behaviors such as identifying consent and distinguishing it from 
coerced acquiescence, talking openly about sex and boundaries with a 
partner, and identifying and respecting a partner’s boundaries.238 
Public health programs can also teach populations to identify when 
others engage in sexual assault or other abusive behavior and how to 
intercede.239 
These interventions provide a powerful opportunity to address 
behaviors that contribute to rape but are outside the scope of criminal 
law. There are many behaviors and attitudes that contribute to rape 
culture and increase the risk of rape that are unsuitable for criminal 
punishment. For example, the CDC’s surveillance of sexual violence 
includes behaviors that are often noncriminal, such as bartering for sex, 
pressuring another into sex by threatening to end the relationship, 
making untrue promises in exchange for sex, or the humiliation of a 
partner.240 Some of these may not rise to the level of criminalization or 
may be difficult to criminalize. Public health interventions can 
nonetheless address these behaviors as part of a spectrum of sexual 
violence. 
Criminal law lacks public health law’s ability to address the social 
norms that cause sexual violence.241 Criminal law is, by nature, 
 
 236. See SHIFTING THE PARADIGM, supra note 85, at 5, 7−8; AL VERNACCHIO, FOR 
GOODNESS SEX (2014); Cara Kulwicki, Real Sex Education, in YES MEANS YES, supra note 85, 
at 305, 307−10; Perry, supra note 86, at 197−200, 202−07.  
 237. See Hipp et al., supra note 84, at 7; Kulwicki, supra note 236, at 307−10; Perry, supra note 
86, at 197−200, 202−07; Todres, supra note 209, at 483−84 (discussing mentoring programs); see 
also Elizabeth Schroeder, Could Sex Ed Prevent Another Steubenville?, ANSWER: SEX ED, 
HONESTLY (Apr. 2, 2013), http://answer.rutgers.edu/blog/2013/04/02/could-sex-ed-prevent-
another-steubenville [https://perma.cc/BF58-FPQK] (noting that sexuality education, especially 
if it begins early, can provide important lessons that combat gender stereotypes germane to “rape 
culture”). 
 238. See SHIFTING THE PARADIGM, supra note 85, at 8; Kulwicki, supra note 236, at 305, 
307−10; Perry, supra note 86, at 197−200, 202−07. 
 239. See CDC SURVEY, supra note 66, at 4; SHIFTING THE PARADIGM, supra note 85, at 5−6; 
Todres, supra note 209, at 493−95; see also Piper Fogg, Rape Prevention Programs Proliferate,  
but It’s “Hard to Know” Whether They Work, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 15, 2009), 
http://www.chronicle.com/article/Rape-Prevention-Programs/49151 [https://perma.cc/L8ZB-WU
GA] (discussing an effective program aimed at men that casts them not as potential abusers, but 
rather “potential helpers” who can prevent assaults). 
 240. CDC SURVEY, supra note 66, at 17. 
 241. See supra Part I.B. 
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primarily reactive rather than preventive.242 It does little to change the 
attitudes or conditions that lead to behavior besides providing a 
possible punishment243—one that is mostly responsive to social norms, 
rather than a force for changing them. Dan Kahan’s research explores 
how this “sticky norms” phenomenon thwarts rape law reform.244 
Jurors balk at convicting defendants whose conduct aligns with 
accepted norms, even if the conduct is clearly unlawful.245 In the 
context of rape, “genuine societal ambivalence about the ‘no 
sometimes means yes’ norm”246 prompts jurors to “continue to treat 
verbal resistance as equivocal evidence of nonconsent.”247 This renders 
rape law reform ineffective at changing either legal outcomes or 
culture. Indeed, using criminal law to change cultural attitudes may 
unwittingly exacerbate the problem: jurors’ repeated unwillingness to 
convict sends a message that the conduct is acceptable or, at the very 
least, likely to go unpunished. 
The sticky-norms problem is particularly difficult to resolve when 
it comes to rape. In other areas of law, it may be overcome by reducing 
the penalties for the crime so that jurors will be less hesitant to enforce 
the law.248 Such “gentle nudges,” may allow for slow, incremental 
change to both the law and the cultural norms necessary for its effective 
execution.249 But light penalties for sexual assault may have the 
unintended effect of reinforcing the notion that the conduct does not 
really merit condemnation or punishment, turning a gentle nudge into 
a “sly wink.”250 
As a deterrent, criminal law is notoriously inept at changing norms 
and behaviors, particularly sexual behaviors.251 It is a weak tool to 
 
 242. See McMahon, supra note 186, at 27 (characterizing criminal law as largely responsive 
rather than preventive); Todres, supra note 209, at 480−81 (commenting that research refutes the 
assumption that criminal law effectively deters undesirable behavior). 
 243. McMahon, supra note 186, at 28. 
 244. See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607−08 (2000). 
 245. Id.  
 246. Id. at 623. 
 247. Id. at 607. 
 248. See Dripps, supra note 13, at 1805; Kahan, supra note 244, at 608. 
 249. See Dripps, supra note 13, at 1805; Kahan, supra note 244, at 607−22.  
 250. Kahan, supra note 244, at 624−25. Kahan proposes shaming penalties in the context of 
campus codes. For a discussion of this approach, see supra note 17.  
 251. See Bryden, supra note 30, at 419−20 (arguing that even radical changes in rape law “may 
not percolate down to most citizens” and that conventional, sexual mores often determine how 
people think about sexual crimes); Gruber, supra note 11, at 638−45, 647, 652 (discussing the 
failure of criminal law to deter “date rape” and arguing that the “criminal system” stands in the 
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address attitudes and norms because it addresses only negative 
behavior and is poorly suited to teach positive behavior. Criminal law 
is also limited in its scope; it addresses only the worst behavior meriting 
society’s condemnation. Public health strategies, in contrast, can 
engage the wide range of behaviors and attitudes that increase the risk 
of sexual violence.252 
3. Addressing Social Determinants.  Public health law can also 
move upstream to address social determinants of rape. In recent years, 
public health efforts have increasingly recognized the role of social 
determinants in public health problems.253 Social determinants are 
“social institutions” (including “economic systems and political 
structures”), surroundings (such as “neighborhoods [and] 
workplaces”), and “social relationships” (such as hierarchies and 
“differential treatment of social groups”) that correspond to health 
outcomes.254 Income, environment, gender, race, and other social 
determinants significantly influence health outcomes and create 
substantial health disparities.255 
 
way of potential reforms aimed at reshaping norms); Kaplan, supra note 151, at 1562−63 
(demonstrating that criminal sanctions have had no positive effect on behaviors or social norms 
regarding HIV exposure); Todres, supra note 209, at 462 (“In the public health arena, criminal 
sanctions have had relatively minimal impact on reshaping behavior and reducing harm.”). There 
are also legitimate concerns about the extent to which criminal law is an appropriate tool to 
change social norms. See Husak & Thomas, supra note 46, at 112; Kahan, supra note 37, at 751. 
 252. See McMahon, supra note 186, at 28. 
 253. See Laurie M. Anderson, Susan C. Scrimshaw, Mindy T. Fullilove, Jonathan E. Fielding 
& Task Force on Cmty. Preventive Srvs., The Community Guide’s Model for Linking the Social 
Environment to Health, 24 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 12, 12 (2003); Mariner, supra note 189, at 
253−54; Michael Marmot, Social Determinants of Health Inequalities, 365 LANCET 1099, 1101−02 
(2005); David R. Williams, Manuela V. Costa, Adebola O. Odunlami & Selina A. Mohammed, 
Moving Upstream: How Interventions That Address the Social Determinants of Health Can 
Improve Health and Reduce Disparities, 14 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC. S8, S8 (2008); 
Nazleen Bharmal, Kathryn Pitkin Derose, Melissa Felician & Margaret M. Weden, 
Understanding the Upstream Social Determinants of Health (RAND Corp., Working Paper No. 
WR-1096-RC, 2015), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/WR1000/
WR1096/RAND_WR1096.pdf [https://perma.cc/WNS3-GN49]. 
 254. Anderson et al., supra note 253, at 12. 
 255. See NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2011, WITH 
SPECIAL FEATURE ON SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND HEALTH 24−25 (2012), http://www.cdc.
gov/nchs/data/hus/hus11.pdf [https://perma.cc/C442-L8T2]; CERD WORKING GRP. FOR HEALTH 
& ENVT’L HEALTH, UNEQUAL HEALTH OUTCOMES IN THE UNITED STATES: RACIAL AND 
ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE TREATMENT AND ACCESS, THE ROLE OF SOCIAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH, AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE 18−24 
(2008), http://www.prrac.org/pdf/CERDhealthEnvironmentReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8QZ-
L3CH]; Anderson et al., supra note 253, at 12−13; Ichiro Kawachi, Norman Daniels & Dean E. 
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Relationships between social institutions and health outcomes 
tend to be complex and involve the interplay of multiple factors. For 
example, African American breast cancer patients have higher 
mortality rates than white breast cancer patients.256 While racial 
discrimination and disparity in access to health care seem like obvious 
causes, the actual explanation is more complex.257 African American 
women tend to be diagnosed with a type of cancer that is by nature 
harder to treat and more lethal.258 The disparity in types of diagnoses 
is not genetic, but rather related to earlier onset of menstruation and 
higher obesity rates among African American women, which in turn is 
caused by socioeconomic, environmental, and cultural factors that limit 
access to healthy foods and exercise.259 
Likewise, numerous social determinants contribute to the risk of 
rape, in particular those that perpetuate socioeconomic, racial, and 
gender inequality.260 Poverty is associated with, and may cause, higher 
incidences of rape and other intimate-partner violence.261 Racial 
minorities experience higher rates of rape.262 There is also a growing 
consensus that the structural inequality of women in the social, 
political, and economic order contributes to rape.263 
Public health law provides a framework that can analyze and 
address the social determinants that cause sexual assault. As discussed 
above, public health laws are informed by data collection and analysis 
 
Robinson, Health Disparities by Race and Class: Why Both Matter, 24 HEALTH AFF. 343, 343 
(2005); Bharmal et al., supra note 253, at 1−6.  
 256. See OTIS WEBB BRAWLEY, HOW WE DO HARM: A DOCTOR BREAKS RANKS ABOUT 
BEING SICK IN AMERICA 13−17 (2012). 
 257. See id.  
 258. See id. 
 259. See id. 
 260. See CDC SURVEY, supra note 66, at 4; Rachel Jewkes, Intimate Partner Violence: Causes 
and Prevention, 359 LANCET 1423, 1424−36 (2002) (discussing rape in the context of intimate 
partner violence); Ruth D. Peterson & William C. Bailey, Rape and Dimensions of Gender 
Socioeconomic Inequality in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 29 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 162, 
162−67 (1992); N.Y.C. All. Against Sexual Assault, Sexual Violence Is a Public Health  
Issue, TORCH (SPRING 2009), http://svfreenyc.org/media/newsletter/issue_30.pdf [https://perma.
cc/M7T5-EVMQ].  
 261. See Jewkes, supra note 260, at 1424; Peterson & Bailey, supra note 260, at 164. 
 262. See supra note 79; see also Melissa Harris-Perry, Rape and Race: We Have to Talk About 
It, ROOT (Apr. 10, 2008), http://www.theroot.com/articles/culture/2008/04/rape_and_race_we_
have_to_talk_about_it.html [https://perma.cc/F2JR-WWF8] (“[R]ape is complicated by race.”); 
Peterson & Bailey, supra note 260, at 163–65 (discussing an argument which theorizes that higher 
rates of rape stem from racial inequality). 
 263. See Hines, supra note 99, at 404–20; Jewkes, supra note 260, at 1425–26; Peterson & 
Bailey, supra note 260, at 162, 165–67. 
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that assess the complex causes of problematic behaviors. This analysis 
can be used to create legal interventions that specifically address these 
underlying causes. Moreover, because public health law is not cabined 
in a certain legal realm, it can employ several types of laws and policies 
to achieve these goals. 
Public health approaches are more capable of addressing social 
determinants than criminal law. The ecological model of primary 
prevention, for example, analyzes the interplay of individual, 
relationship, community, and societal factors that promote sexual 
violence.264 It also employs prevention strategies that address risk at 
the individual, relationship, community, and societal levels.265 Criminal 
law is simply neither designed nor equipped to study the complex 
causes of sexual violence or to engage in effective prevention 
strategies.266 Its punitive nature often exacerbates social determinants 
and creates an antagonistic relationship with marginalized 
communities.267 
C. Legal and Policy Interventions 
1. Preliminary Thoughts.  It would be foolhardy to attempt to 
catalogue every legal intervention that a public health approach to rape 
could entail. In fact, public health law’s broad scope and reliance on 
evidence-based interventions would make this task impossible. These 
laws must rely on the collection and analysis of data, the testing of 
different types of interventions, and careful weighing of which methods 
would be most effective. 
This Section provides salient examples of legal interventions a 
public health framework might employ to meet the challenges rape 
 
 264. See SHIFTING THE PARADIGM, supra note 85, at 8 (discussing the ecological model); 
Todres, supra note 209, at 485–86 (discussing the ecological model in the context of human 
trafficking). 
 265. See SHIFTING THE PARADIGM, supra note 85, at 8. 
 266. See Gruber, supra note 11, at 624, 645 (arguing that criminal law’s focus on individual 
culpability and not economic and social conditions obscures the nature of many causes of rape); 
Todres, supra note 209, at 453–54, 463–64 (discussing the limitations of criminal law in the context 
of human trafficking, including its “narrow focus on the state-perpetrator dynamic” at the expense 
of analyzing “community- and population-based impacts”).  
 267. See Badi Hasisi, Police, Politics, and Culture in a Deeply Divided Society, 98 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 1119, 1123 (2008). For example, the criminalization of sex work may increase 
the incidence of rape among sex workers. See Scott Cunningham & Manisha Shah, 
Decriminalizing Indoor Prostitution: Implications for Sexual Violence and Public Health 30 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20281, 2014) (providing evidence that 
decriminalization of prostitution decreases sexual violence). 
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poses. It begins the larger discussion of how the law can address the 
problems of rape in ways that it has thus far largely ignored. An array 
of legal tools is necessary to effectively shape the attitudes, values, and 
behaviors that make sexual violence so ubiquitous and difficult for 
criminal law to address. 
The examples this Article explores demonstrate that shifting to a 
public health law framework would require fundamental changes to 
many of our laws, policies, and resources. At minimum, it would 
require lawmakers and scholars to rethink approaches to education 
laws (such as Title IX), curricular requirements, public health mass 
media campaigns, and efforts to address the social determinants of 
sexual violence.268 
2. Fostering an Evidence-Based Approach: Data Collection.  Public 
efforts to collect data on sexual assault currently exist but are 
insufficiently coordinated and lack a focus on underlying causes 
necessary for effective prevention. This is in large part because data 
are often collected after the fact. The CDC, for example, uses surveys 
of victims to determine the prevalence of sexual violence and the 
demographic characteristics of victims.269 Where CDC data collection 
focuses on behavioral risk, it looks to the risk of becoming a victim 
rather than the risk of becoming a perpetrator.270 
 
 268. While Part II.C divides these interventions into categories, in reality laws are likely to be 
far more interconnected. Changes to education law would require and be informed by increased 
data collection and funding to test curricular requirements. Educational requirements would 
likely interact with programs that address social determinants, such as models that use a 
combination of curricular requirements and home visits to help support struggling families. See 
generally Sorenson & Dodge, supra note 232 (studying the Fast Track childhood intervention 
program). 
 269. See CDC SURVEY, supra note 66. The National Electronic Injury Surveillance System-
All Injury Program provides data on nonfatal injuries treated in U.S. hospital emergency 
departments, including those related to sexual violence. The National Violence Against Women 
Survey interviewed women about their general fear of violence, emotional abuse, physical 
assaults, forcible rape, stalking, and threats of violence. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, SEXUAL VIOLENCE DATA SOURCES, http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/
sexualviolence/datasources.html [https://perma.cc/V28Y-VE69] [hereinafter CDC DATA 
SOURCES]. 
 270. The Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) tracks health conditions and 
risk behaviors in the United States through surveys conducted by state health departments. The 
CDC briefly funded an optional module to the BRFSS on sexual violence victimization between 
2005 and 2007. CDC DATA SOURCES, supra note 269. Private institutions tend to take the same 
tactic. For example, when the Association of American Universities created a survey of campus 
sexual assault, they focused on the prevalence of nonconsensual sexual contact and the 
demographics of the victims. They did not collect data on perpetrators or on the attitudes and 
norms that are associated with rates of nonconsensual sexual contact. See DAVID CANTOR, 
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This focus is somewhat predictable. Surveys can more easily 
collect data from victims than perpetrators, who may be less likely to 
admit their actions. Analyzing causes of sexual assault, such as the 
effect of norms and attitudes, is also more difficult than determining 
the number of sexual assaults from crime statistics or telephone 
surveys. 
A robust public health law framework, however, requires a 
concentrated effort to meet these challenges. Public health law’s focus 
on evidence-based prevention necessitates coordinated data collection 
on causes, in particular on what causes sexual-violence perpetration. 
Surveys that collect data on perpetrator behavior, attitudes, and beliefs 
can provide insights into the norms that contribute to sexual 
aggression. The obstacles to collecting this data are not 
insurmountable. Evidence suggests, for example, that surveys of 
perpetrators or potential perpetrators are more likely to be successful 
if they ask about specific behaviors rather than value-laden terms like 
rape (for example, “Have you ever coerced somebody to intercourse 
by holding them down?” instead of, “Have you ever raped 
somebody?”).271  
A public health framework therefore requires a strong mandate 
for national, state, and local public health authorities to conduct data 
collection on the causes of sexual assault and risk. This legislative 
mandate would be most effective if it set forth minimum standards for 
data collection. Previous legislative mandates provide examples of 
strong and coordinated mandates. For example, the ACA mandates 
national data collection on racial health disparities.272 Similarly, 
VAWA mandates data collection on domestic and sexual violence.273 
Public health authorities can also partner with other experts to 
generate creative ways to collect data. A legislative mandate can, for 
 
BONNIE FISHER, SUSAN CHIBNALL, REANNE TOWNSEND, HYUNSHIK LEE, CAROL BRUCE & 
GAIL THOMAS, REPORT ON THE AAU CAMPUS CLIMATE SURVEY ON SEXUAL ASSAULT AND 
SEXUAL MISCONDUCT (2015). 
 271. See Edwards et al., supra note 103, at 188, 190; Mary P. Koss, Hidden Rape: Sexual 
Aggression and Victimization in a National Sample of Students in Higher Education, in 2 RAPE 
AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 3 (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1988).  
 272. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., IMPLEMENTATION GUIDANCE ON DATA 
COLLECTION STANDARDS FOR RACE, ETHNICITY, SEX, PRIMARY LANGUAGE, AND DISABILITY 
STATUS (2011) [hereinafter DATA COLLECTION STANDARDS], https://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/
hhs-implementation-guidance-data-collection-standards-race-ethnicity-sex-primary-language-
and-disability-status [https://perma.cc/6NEM-AUJS]. 
 273. See, e.g., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE DATA 
COLLECTION: A REPORT UNDER THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT (1996).  
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example, require the collection of data in public schools on behaviors, 
gender norms, and attitudes about sexual behavior and consent. 
Congress can expand Title IX requirements to require similar data 
collection in universities. 
Such mandates can and should take advantage of partnerships 
with private and educational institutions. State or local public health 
authorities may have limited capacity to collect data or may lack the 
resources or expertise to analyze the nuanced causes of sexual violence. 
Legislative mandates can respond to this problem by allowing 
partnerships with other public and private institutions. The ACA, for 
example, allows federally funded population surveys on health care 
disparities to be contracted to private actors.274 A public health law 
framework for rape should take advantage of the broad scope of public 
health law by encouraging partnerships with community organizations, 
private actors, and educational institutions. 
3. Education Laws and Policies.  Education is a powerful means of 
changing sexual attitudes and behavior.275 A public health law 
approach to rape could provide both the opportunity and obligation to 
improve our education laws and policies. In contrast to current 
education laws and policies, which form an underwhelming and 
piecemeal approach to addressing the social norms that encourage 
rape, it could strengthen and refocus Title IX on creating mandatory, 
evidence-based educational requirements for those enrolled in college. 
More important, however, is how it could create a massive shift in 
education law by focusing on students in kindergarten through high 
school. Taking rape seriously as a public health problem requires 
national and state curricula to integrate sexual assault prevention into 
improved, evidence-based sexuality education. It also requires the 
federal government and states to jettison curricula that teach students 
rape myths. 
Title IX, perhaps the most well-known use of education law to 
prevent sexual assault, focuses primarily on schools’ responses to 
sexual assaults rather than prevention. Title IX encourages colleges to 
enact rape-prevention education, but provides no mandate and no 
 
 274. See DATA COLLECTION STANDARDS, supra note 272. 
 275. See SHIFTING THE PARADIGM, supra note 85, at 7–9 (identifying effective ways in which 
education programs and community involvement can change social norms, “preventing sexual 
violence before it occurs”); Todres, supra note 209, at 488 (discussing success of various public 
health campaigns).  
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standards for content or evidence-based practices.276 Programs occur at 
the discretion of universities and university groups. 
As a result, existing college rape-prevention programs are 
piecemeal and vary considerably in their content and effectiveness. 
Many programs are simply single-session sexual-violence 
interventions, which evidence shows are ineffective and perhaps even 
counterproductive.277 Several programs reinforce gendered scripts for 
sex that encourage sexual aggression against women: namely, that 
women are responsible for stopping others from raping them.278 These 
programs reflect or contain the common advice that women who do 
not want to be raped should avoid alcohol, dress conservatively, travel 
in groups, and be on constant alert about their surroundings.279 
A public health law framework provides the opportunity to 
strengthen Title IX requirements for universities and gear them toward 
prevention. In particular, it could mandate minimum hours of 
evidence-based sexuality-education programs that address sexual 
coercion, violence, and healthy relationships. Such programs might 
take the role of a curricular requirement or might integrate peer 
educators (a strategy with demonstrated effectiveness).280 These 
educational requirements would be able to implement strategies that 
change social and cultural norms, offer positive models for sexual 
 
 276. See supra note 21. In addition, the U.S. Department of Justice Office on Violence 
Against Women offers grants to colleges to develop or strengthen policies related to prevention. 
Dear Colleague Letter, supra note 21, at 15–19. 
 277. See Basile, supra note 219, at 2351; McMahon, supra note 186, at 34 (finding that 
programs directed at men tend to be under two hours long and thus are unlikely to have long-
term effects). 
 278. See Basile, supra note 219, at 2350–51; see also Filipovic, supra note 85, at 23–24 (arguing 
that “self-defense” classes send a false message “that women can prevent rape,” and 
problematically divert attention from “the perpetrator’s” conduct to the victim’s); Erica 
Schwiegershausen, Should We Teach Women Rape-Prevention Tactics?, N.Y. MAG. (June 15, 
2015), http://nymag.com/thecut/2015/06/should-we-teach-women-rape-prevention-tactics.html 
[https://perma.cc/2SLP-C2U7] (noting that although rape-prevention programs may be viewed by 
some as empowering, they reinforce a victim-blaming narrative); Jessica Valenti, We Need to Stop 
Rapists, Not Change Who Gets Raped, GUARDIAN (June 12, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2015/jun/12/stop-rapists-not-change-who-gets-raped [https://perma.cc/A96G-YM
3K] (“[T]here’s a real danger in believing the solution to sexual assault is on the shoulders of 
women who might be attacked.”). 
 279. See Basile, supra note 219, at 2351; McMahon, supra note 186, at 29; Schwiegershausen, 
supra note 278; Valenti, supra note 278; see also Filipovic, supra note 85, at 23–24 (cataloging 
suggestions offered to women that are “well-meaning” but promote the incorrect notion that 
“women can prevent rape”). 
 280. See Berkowitz, supra note 228, at 719; Fogg, supra note 239. 
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relationships, and help students develop skills to determine a partner’s 
consent and talk openly about sexual boundaries. 
A strong public health approach to rape, however, would include 
legal interventions that begin far earlier than college.281 Despite the 
recent public focus on campus rape, nearly half of rapes occur before 
victims are in college.282 Gender roles and norms are established at a 
very early age and carry through to judgments later in life.283 
Prevention education works best when it mirrors the way people learn 
social norms, beginning early and repeating and progressing over a 
long period of time.284 Interventions that encourage empathy and 
respect and reject gender norms that encourage sexual violence should 
start at an early age and progress in an age-appropriate way.285 
An effective approach will require a more substantial, consistent, 
and long-term investment in public education curricula. Programs with 
the greatest evidence of effectiveness focus on changing social attitudes 
and norms and improving peer-helping and conflict-resolution skills.286 
Countries such as the Netherlands, for example, provide models for 
evidence-based, age-appropriate curricula that address sexual coercion 
and teach positive relationship skills. Students in the Netherlands begin 
to discuss love and respect at age four as part of a comprehensive 
 
 281. See Basile, supra note 219, at 2351.  
 282. Between 42 and 61 percent of female victims are raped before age eighteen and 28 
percent of male victims were raped before they turned eleven. See CDC SURVEY, supra note 66, 
at 2, 25; Schafran, supra note 41, at 15.  
 283. See Jennifer S. Hendricks & Dawn Marie Howerton, Teaching Values, Teaching 
Stereotypes: Sex Education and Indoctrination in Public Schools, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 587, 603 
(2011); see also Michelle J. Anderson, Sex Education and Rape, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 83, 87–
97 (2010) (describing how teenagers and children pick up social norms and stereotypes about sex 
and gender).  
 284. See McMahon, supra note 193, at 475. 
 285. See CDC SURVEY, supra note 66, at 4 (discussing the need for early prevention efforts 
that promote healthy, respectful relationships); Basile, supra note 219, at 2351 (arguing for a 
“comprehensive multilevel approach, including a focus on younger ages and potential 
perpetrators, to address this public health crisis”); see also Anderson, supra note 283, at 97, 104–
07 (lamenting that American sex education fails to counter “negative messages about sexuality 
advanced in popular media”); Schroeder, supra note 237 (noting the effectiveness of sexuality 
education programs to which children are exposed early in childhood and that counter prevailing 
norms). 
 286. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SEXUAL VIOLENCE: PREVENTION 
STRATEGIES, http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/sexualviolence/prevention.html [https://
perma.cc/W57G-KTKK] (discussing characteristics of evidence-based programs). 
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sexuality program that progresses throughout each school year.287 As 
they reach eight, students discuss self-image and gender stereotypes; 
eleven-year-olds discuss sexual orientation and contraceptive 
options.288 Lessons help children discuss—in addition to the mechanics 
of sex and disease prevention—what types of intimacy feel good and 
what types do not, as well as how to express and respect personal 
boundaries.289 
Currently, the CDC funds programs in public schools to change 
social norms associated with sexual violence. The CDC’s Rape 
Prevention and Education Program (RPE) provides grants for primary 
prevention tactics, notably behavioral-change skills, at the individual, 
relationship, community, and societal levels.290 The CDC also runs 
smaller programs that target specific communities, such as Dating 
Matters, which works with children ages eleven to fourteen in high-
risk, urban communities.291 
These programs, however, are quite limited in scope and funding. 
Dating Matters, for example, reaches only four urban areas in the 
country.292 RPE is currently underfunded, leaving programs without 
the resources they need to continue interventions in schools and 
communities.293 Their isolated and inconsistent approach cannot by 
itself create the change necessary to address the epidemic proportions 
of sexual violence. 
National and state curricular requirements are also either 
completely absent or woefully inadequate. The Common Core 
contains no sexuality-education requirement, and there are no national 
mandates for sexuality education in elementary, middle, or high 
 
 287. See Saskia De Melker, The Case for Starting Sex Education in Kindergarten, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (May 27, 2015), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/spring-fever/ [https://perma.
cc/CH9E-4AAC]. 
 288. See id. 
 289. See id. 
 290. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, RAPE PREVENTION EDUCATION: 
TRANSFORMING COMMUNITIES TO PREVENT SEXUAL VIOLENCE, http://www.cdc.giv/violence
prevention/pdf/rpe-fact-sheet-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y59P-EM36]; NAT’L ALL. TO END SEXUAL 
VIOLENCE, RAPE PREVENTION AND EDUCATION PROGRAM FACT SHEET (2011), 
http://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/Publications_NSVRC_Factsheet_Rape-Prevention-and-
Education-Program.pdf [https://perma.cc/2J5A-UWPL].  
 291. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DATING MATTERS INITIATIVE, 
http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/datingmatters [https://perma.cc/3578-9HRP]. 
 292. See id. 
 293. See NAT’L ALL. TO END SEXUAL VIOLENCE, RAPE PREVENTION & EDUCATION 
PROGRAM (RPE), http://endsexualviolence.org/files/NAESVrpeFY16Final1.pdf [https://perma.
cc/9F4R-3SHX]. 
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school.294 Only twenty-four states and the District of Columbia require 
any sexuality education to be taught in schools.295 Just over half of 
states require that sexuality education stress abstinence, and nineteen 
require schools to teach the importance of confining sex to marriage.296 
Accordingly, despite the recent introduction of funding for sexuality 
education, the federal government still funds curricula that teach that 
sex is only acceptable in the context of marriage (abstinence-only 
education).297 Even so-called comprehensive sexuality education 
maintains the same abstinence-based core message.298 
When schools provide sexuality education, they rarely address 
sexual assault, coercion, or harassment appropriately and often 
reinforce negative messages. A majority of states do not require that 
sexuality education include information about these topics.299 Some 
states require schools to address sexual coercion, but their curricula 
tend to interpret coercion very narrowly.300 Neither abstinence-only 
 
 294. See COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS INITIATIVE, COMMON CORE STATE 
STANDARDS FOR ENGLISH LANGUAGE ARTS AND LITERACY IN HISTORY, SOCIAL STUDIES, 
SCIENCE, AND TECHNICAL SUBJECTS, http://www.corestandards.org/wp-content/uploads/ELA_
Standards1.pdf [https://perma.cc/47PG-B9GL]; COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS INITIATIVE, 
COMMON CORE STATE STANDARDS FOR MATHEMATICS, http://www.corestandards.org/wp-
content/uploads/Math_Standards1.pdf [https://perma.cc/53N6-4JKB]; Alice Dreger, Why Isn’t 
Sex Education a Part of Common Core?, PAC. STANDARD (Feb. 27, 2015), http://www.
psmag.com/health-and-behavior/its-not-that-hard-to-put-a-condom-on [https://perma.cc/T7CX-
5DWT]. 
 295. See GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: SEX AND HIV EDUCATION (2016), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SE.pdf [https://perma.cc/BD7C-5NFD].  
 296. See id.  
 297. Richard Carmona, Joycelyn Elders & David Satcher, Opinion, Renew the U.S. 
Commitment to Sex Education, WASH. POST (May 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/renew-the-us-commitment-to-sex-education/2015/05/22/8b86980e-fe53-11e4-833c-
a2de05b6b2a4_story.html?utm_term=.2e95fd59ca21 [https://perma.cc/2TGA-MXFB]; Nicole 
Cushman, Debra Hauser & Monica Rodriguez, We’ve Been Here Before: Congress Quietly 
Increases Funding for Abstinence-Only Programs, REWIRE (Apr. 23, 2015), https://rewire.news/
article/2015/04/23/weve-congress-quietly-increases-funding-abstinence-programs [https://perma.
cc/Q5NR-LA9S]; see Heather D. Boonstra, Sex Education: Another Big Step Forward—And a 
Step Back, 13 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., 27, 27–28 (2010); Jason Koebler, Abstinence-Only 
Education Debate Resurfaces, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 28, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/education/
blogs/high-school-notes/2011/12/28/abstinence-only-education-debate-resurfaces [https://perma.
cc/5GKC-CHVY]. Congress increased this funding by 50 percent in 2015. Cheryl Wetzstein, Sex-
Education Funds to Be Renewed, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2015/apr/15/sex-education-funds-to-be-renewed/ [https://perma.cc/K6S3-SYST]. 
 298. See Anderson, supra note 283, at 99–101. 
 299. See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 295. 
 300. See 1 GIRLHOOD IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 8 (Miriam Forman-Brunell ed., 
2001); Christine E. Beyer & Roberta J. Ogletree, Sexual Coercion Content in Twenty-One 
Sexuality Education Curricula, 68 J. SCH. HEALTH 370, 372–74 (1998). 
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nor comprehensive sexuality-education curricula provide sufficient 
discussion of sexual coercion and sexual boundaries.301 In the words of 
one participant of an abstinence-only curriculum, “We never talked 
about consent because with [an] abstinence curriculum you shouldn’t 
consent.”302 Sexuality-education curricula also fail to discuss consent in 
the context of queer sex, ignoring these sexual relationships or 
portraying them in a negative light.303  
Perhaps more troubling is how curricula—particularly abstinence-
only curricula—reinforce gender norms and stereotypes that 
perpetuate rape myths. Curricula often limit discussion of sexual 
violence and coercion to the victim’s behavior and responsibility.304 
They perpetuate the stereotypes that men are inherent sexual 
aggressors and that women have the responsibility to stop unwanted 
sex.305 They portray young men as having a strong “natural” desire for 
sex absent in women.306 Because girls lack this natural desire, they are 
responsible for stopping boys if a “kiss is leading to something else.”307 
They warn students that boys will not be able to respect girls who dress 
in a way that boys find sexy and caution that “girls have an added 
 
 301. See JULIE F. KAY & ASHLEY JACKSON, SEX, LIES, AND STEREOTYPES: HOW 
ABSTINENCE-ONLY PROGRAMS HARM WOMEN AND GIRLS 20 (2008), http://hrp.law. 
harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/sexlies_stereotypes2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/DXE6-
SKJ5]; Anderson, supra note 283, at 103–04. 
 302. KAY & JACKSON, supra note 301, at 10. 
 303. See Michelle Fine & Sara I. McClelland, Sexuality Education and Desire: Still Missing 
After All These Years, 76 HARV. EDUC. REV. 297, 306, 310–11 (2006); Hendricks & Howerton, 
supra note 283, at 601. Only nine states require a curriculum inclusive of all sexual orientations. 
GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 295. Four other states require curricula to discuss queer sexuality 
in a negative light. Id. 
 304. See Hendricks & Howerton, supra note 283, at 599. Even comprehensive sexuality 
education, which several advocates laud over abstinence-only education, focuses on the victim’s 
responsibility. The Sexuality Information and Education Council of the United States (SIECUS) 
describes comprehensive sexuality education as a program that teaches “young people the skills 
to make responsible decisions about sexuality, including how to avoid unwanted verbal, physical, 
and sexual advances.” SIECUS, FACT SHEET: WHAT THE RESEARCH SAYS . . . COMPREHENSIVE 
SEXUALITY EDUCATION 1 (2009), http://www.siecus.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.ViewPage
&PageID=1193 [https://perma.cc/736J-4F9Y] (emphasis added). 
 305. See KAY & JACKSON, supra note 301, at 20; SIECUS, IN THEIR OWN WORDS: WHAT 
ABSTINENCE-ONLY-UNTIL-MARRIAGE PROGRAMS SAY 2 (2005); Hendricks & Howerton, supra 
note 283, at 598–99. 
 306. See KAY & JACKSON, supra note 301, at 20; SIECUS, supra note 305, at 2; Hendricks & 
Howerton, supra note 283, at 598–600. 
 307. SIECUS, supra note 305, at 2; see Hendricks & Howerton, supra note 283, at 598–99 
(describing educational approaches that hold girls responsible for controlling the sexual impulses 
of their male peers and assuming that girls do not have sexual urges).  
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responsibility to wear modest clothing that doesn’t invite lustful 
thoughts.”308 
These curricula simultaneously discourage students, and girls in 
particular, from talking openly about their sexual desires and 
boundaries. Several curricula explicitly teach girls not to assert 
themselves with men, discouraging the skills necessary for healthy, 
open sexual communication. One curriculum, for example, tells the 
story of a knight who rejected a princess after she gave him advice on 
how to rescue her, warning that “occasional assistance may be all right, 
but too much will lessen a man’s confidence or even turn him away 
from his princess.”309 
An effective public health law framework would likely require 
substantial changes in our education laws. The Common Core—
whatever its shortcomings—should be revised to include evidence-
based sexuality-education requirements. These requirements should 
include programs that address sexual norms and behaviors that 
contribute to rape. Such mandates could task the CDC, in partnership 
with other pioneers in sexuality education and violence reduction, with 
devising and recommending requirements that draw from proven 
interventions.310  
Congress could also influence state-level curricular requirements 
by tying them to grant eligibility or federal funding, as it has done with 
abstinence-only education and the Common Core. Or it could support 
an increase of CDC-funded programs to reduce sexual violence. This 
spending could be offset in part by an elimination of abstinence-only 
education funding, a budget which is 50 percent larger than the CDC’s 
grants for rape-prevention education.311 
 
 308. Hendricks & Howerton, supra note 283, at 589. 
 309. See id. (citation omitted). 
 310. A potentially valuable partner is the Future of Sex Education Initiative (FoSE), a 
partnership between Advocates for Youth, Answer, and SIECUS. It publishes the National 
Sexuality Education Standards: Core Content and Skills (NSES), which sets forth minimum core 
content for sexuality education that is developmentally and age-appropriate for students in grades 
K–12. See generally FOSE, NATIONAL SEXUALITY EDUCATION STANDARDS: CORE CONTENT 
AND SKILLS, K-12 (2011), http://www.futureofsexed.org/documents/josh-fose-standards-web.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VUJ7-UQ9Z]. The NSES, however, does not provide significant guidance on 
curricular requirements for consent, coercion, and healthy sexuality; it is likely that additional 
research and development would be needed to create requirements that can effect significant 
change in the norms and attitudes that contribute to sexual assault. See id. 
 311. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2016, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATE FOR APPROPRIATION COMMITTEES 
11, 38, 292 (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/budget/documents/fy2016/fy-2016-cdc-congressional-
justification.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NG5-ZKME]; Boonstra, supra note 297, at 282–96. 
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4. Engaging Mass Media Strategies.  Mass media campaigns have 
demonstrated the ability to change sexual norms and behaviors.312 In 
the context of sexual violence, media campaigns can reach a wide 
audience, increase public awareness and discussion, and change the 
gender norms that encourage sexual violence.313 They can also model 
and promote healthy sexual attitudes and behaviors.314 The media’s 
potential to reach broad audiences is particularly useful when it comes 
to reaching men, who might otherwise dismiss sexual violence and rape 
prevention as a women’s issue and irrelevant to them. 
Canadian cities have had recent success with campaigns that target 
men. The “Don’t Be That Guy” campaign in Vancouver sought to raise 
awareness and change attitudes and behaviors among men about 
consent and sexual assault.315 The campaign proved remarkably 
popular and soon spread to other cities, where it showed surprising 
effectiveness.316 Vancouver police, for example, credited the campaign 
 
 312. See, e.g., Daniel Romer et al., Mass Media as an HIV-Prevention Strategy: Using 
Culturally Sensitive Messages to Reduce HIV-Associated Sexual Behavior of At-Risk African 
American Youth, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2150, 2154 (2009); M.C. Yzer, F.W. Siero & B.P. Buunk, 
Can Public Campaigns Effectively Change Psychological Determinants of Safer Sex? An 
Evaluation of Three Dutch Campaigns, 15 HEALTH EDUC. RES. 339, 349 (2000). 
 313. See NAT’L HEALTH SERV. & HEALTH DEV. AGENCY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUBLIC 
HEALTH CAMPAIGNS 3–4 (2004), http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_94034_
EN_Effectiveness%20of%20Mass%20Media%20campaigns%20HDA.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6
PD-ZF8E] (describing the ability of media campaigns to reach wide audiences and encourage 
awareness and discussion); WORLD HEALTH ORG., PROMOTING GENDER EQUALITY TO 
PREVENT VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 11–12 (2009), http://www.who.int/violence_injury_
prevention/violence/gender.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8UV-PEVS]. 
 314. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., CHANGING CULTURAL AND SOCIAL NORMS SUPPORTIVE 
OF VIOLENCE 7 (2009), http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/norms.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7NRW-LA2S]; cf. Joseph Erbentraut, Positive Messages in Public Health 
Campaigns Could Be More Effective than Negative Ones, HUFFINGTON POST (May 29,  
2015, 12:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/29/positive-public-health-messages_n_
7461938.html [https://perma.cc/B3GH-9E73] (describing studies that have found that positive 
advertisement campaigns may be more effective with a general audience than negative messaging 
in areas such as healthful eating and smoking cessation).  
 315. “Don’t Be That Guy” Posters Hit Vancouver Bars, HUFFINGTON POST B.C. (July 4,  
2013, 7:41 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2013/07/04/dont-be-that-guy-posters-vancouver_n_
3548162.html [https://perma.cc/M5NS-YVJN]; Michelle Butterfield, Edmonton Sexual Assault 
Awareness Campaign: “Don’t Be That Guy” So Effective City Relaunches with New Posters, 
HUFFINGTON POST ALTA. (Dec. 1, 2012, 12:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2012/12/01/
edmonton-sexual-assault-awareness-campaign-dont-be-that-guy_n_2224228.html [https://perma.
cc/B8CP-WAVT]. 
 316. See “Don’t Be That Guy” Posters Hit Vancouver Bars, supra note 315; Butterfield, supra 
note 315; Robert Matas, “Don’t Be That Guy” Ad Campaign Cuts Vancouver Sex Assaults by Ten 
Per Cent in 2011, GLOBE & MAIL (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-
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with contributing to a 10 percent decrease in sexual assaults, the first 
decrease in several years.317 The campaign expanded in subsequent 
years to include additional types of sexual assault, including sexual 
assault in the context of LGBT relationships.318 
A public health framework for rape law affords the opportunity to 
increase the scope and effectiveness of media campaigns addressing 
sexual violence and healthy sexual relationships. The CDC and the 
White House have funded and continue to fund campaigns, 
particularly at the local and university levels, and universities 
themselves often run campaigns targeting students.319 A public health 
framework could expand and enrich public investment in these efforts 
as well as research into the most effective messages and media. 
One possible method of accomplishing this might be to tie media 
campaign requirements to Title IX requirements or grant 
opportunities. Such efforts should provide mandatory content 
standards that draw on existing research—such as marketing research 
and behavior-change theory—to shift behaviors.320 In particular, media 
campaigns should take advantage of their broad scope to target male 
audiences’ beliefs about gender norms and consent. Such campaigns 
are particularly effective when they understand the behavior and 
attitudes of audience members and engage with members of the 
community to create culturally appropriate messages.321 For example, 
messages that rely on fear and shame are often less effective than those 
that call on men to take responsibility for their actions and give them a 
powerful role in creating positive change.322 
Use of mass media, however, need not be limited to public health 
campaigns. Working with industries that produce films, commercials, 
television, and other media can leverage existing resources. It can also 
 
columbia/dont-be-that-guy-ad-campaign-cuts-vancouver-sex-assaults-by-10-per-cent-in-2011/
article1359241 [https://perma.cc/7ZL4-H2J7].  
 317. See Matas, supra note 316. 
 318. See Butterfield, supra note 315.  
 319. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: LAUNCH OF THE “IT’S ON US” PUBLIC 
AWARENESS CAMPAIGN TO HELP PREVENT CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT (2014), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/19/fact-sheet-launch-it-s-us-public-awareness-campaign
-help-prevent-campus- [https://perma.cc/9WXJ-R6AV]. 
 320. See SHIFTING THE PARADIGM, supra note 85, at 8; Todres, supra note 209, at 488–89; see 
also NAT’L HEALTH SERV. & HEALTH DEV. AGENCY, supra note 313, at 2–4 (describing research 
on effective media campaigns). 
 321. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 313, at 11; Romer et al., supra note 312, at 2150–
53, 2155–56. 
 322. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 314, at 7. 
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change sources of gender stereotyping and rape culture into tools for 
positive social messages. While the public educational system shies 
away from discussions of female sexuality, as discussed in Part II.C.3, 
mass media commonly sexualizes women, particularly young women 
and girls.323 Its depiction of girls and women objectifies and demeans 
them as merely sources of male sexual gratification, focusing on 
women’s sexual utility rather than their sexual agency.324 Public health 
authorities can partner with existing media sources to change attitudes 
about sex, sexuality, and gender norms by making thoughtful changes 
to their portrayal of these topics. 
5. Meeting the Challenges of Social Determinants.  Public health 
law provides a legal framework to analyze and address the many social 
determinants of sexual violence. Poverty and race, for example, 
increase the likelihood of victimization; exposure to violence in 
childhood increases the likelihood of perpetrating sexual violence.325 
Addressing social determinants requires substantial research into the 
complex relationships between multiple interacting causes. 
This is far easier said than done: the social determinants of rape 
are currently understudied and poorly understood.326 Poverty, for 
example, is associated with increased sexual violence, but precisely why 
remains unclear.327 Some theorize that poverty increases stress, which 
leads to sexual violence.328 There is evidence that poverty may 
contribute to rape through a combination of inequality, stress, and 
norms about masculinity; men without the ability to achieve a model 
of masculine success defined in part by wealth may embrace social 
norms that encourage them to control women through violence.329 
 
 323. See Anderson, supra note 283, at 90–94; Fine & McClelland, supra note 303, at 300; 
Jervis, supra note 93, at 166–67.  
 324. See Fine & McClelland, supra note 303, at 300; Jervis, supra note 93, at 166–67. In the 
words of Andrea Dworkin, “The girls are getting fucked but they are not getting free or equal.” 
ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE, at xxxiv (2007). 
 325. See CDC SURVEY, supra note 66, at 2–3, 20–21 (examining the incidence of rape across 
various racial groups); Sarah DeGue et al., , A Systematic Review of Primary Prevention Strategies 
for Sexual Violence Perpetration, 19 AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 346, 359 (2014) (observing 
that childhood exposure to violence increases the risk of later sexual-violence perpetration); 
Jewkes, supra note 260, at 1424 (discussing the link between poverty and intimate-partner 
violence); McMahon, supra note 186, at 32–33 (noting that childhood exposure to media displays 
combining sexual images and violence increases the risk of later sexual-violence perpetration).  
 326. See Jewkes, supra note 260, at 1423; Peterson & Bailey, supra note 260, at 166. 
 327. See Jewkes, supra note 260, at 1424. 
 328. See id.; Peterson & Bailey, supra note 260, at 167, 169–71. 
 329. See Jewkes, supra note 260, at 1424; Peterson & Bailey, supra note 260, at 165. 
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Legal interventions must carefully consider these causes to reduce 
sexual violence effectively. For example, while female empowerment 
is associated with lower levels of intimate-partner violence, providing 
more education and financial independence for women may in some 
scenarios increase their risk.330 Ideologies of male dominance and lack 
of social support for women may be just as—or more—important in 
addressing the risk of violence against women.331 
Initial interventions to address social determinants will most likely 
focus on data collection and analysis. As discussed in Part II.C.2, a 
public health law framework provides an opportunity to create a 
congressional mandate for data collection using public health 
authorities, private institutions, and community organizations. 
Initial research may also support more immediate interventions. 
For example, programs could address the link between childhood 
exposure to violence and childhood delinquency and the risk of 
becoming a perpetrator later in life.332 Educational programs discussed 
in Part II.C.3 might consider following the Fast Track model, which 
integrates home visits for at-risk youth.333 Programs that provide 
support to families reduce the incidence of abuse and neglect and also 
lower the likelihood that children will engage in delinquent behavior 
or commit crimes later in life.334 
D. Theorizing Yes 
Changing the paradigm of rape law can push legal feminism to 
meet the challenge posed by Katherine Franke’s groundbreaking 2001 
work: to “theorize yes.” Her work was a response to feminist legal 
scholarship that adhered to a model stressing protection from sex 
through prohibition.335 That model asked, “How can we prohibit rape 
in a way that truly protects women?”; “How can we prohibit sexual 
 
 330. See Jewkes, supra note 260, at 1424–25. 
 331. See id. at 1425. 
 332. See DeGue et al., supra note 325, at 359; McMahon, supra note 186, at 32–34. 
 333. See Dodge et al., supra note 232, at 59–62, 67–68; see also DeGue et al., supra note 325, 
at 359 (identifying interventions and other solutions to fill the gaps left by current approaches to 
sexual-violence prevention). 
 334. See Dodge et al., supra note 232, at 59–62, 67–68; McMahon, supra note 186, at 34–35. 
 335. See Franke, supra note 8, at 197–98. 
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harassment in a way that truly protects women?”; “How can we 
prohibit exploitation of sex workers?”336 
According to Franke, in this scholarship’s exclusive focus on 
women’s right to say no, it has failed to examine what it might mean to 
say yes.337 Feminist legal scholarship has spent so much effort 
examining what is dangerous and harmful about sex that it has failed 
to sufficiently analyze what can be good and right about sex.338 
Exploring how the law can and should protect sexual pleasure and 
create a “positive domain of non-reproductive sexuality” is no easy 
task.339 Legal feminism needs to rise to this challenge. 
Franke’s criticism reflects legal feminism’s ongoing tension 
between discouraging sexual violence and coercion and promoting 
female positive sexual autonomy.340 Some feminists have criticized 
broad rape laws as paternalistic toward women.341 Such laws, they 
argue, undermine female sexual autonomy by assuming women are 
unable to express their own desires.342 Other critics argue that broad 
rape laws entrench women in the role of victims and discourage them 
from being assertive in sexual encounters.343 Many feminist scholars 
counter that positive sexual autonomy is not exercised in a vacuum, but 
rather in a world that is coercive and violent.344 Laws should not, they 
 
 336. See id. at 199; Aya Gruber, Neofeminism, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1325, 1352–54 (2013) 
(discussing how different tracts of feminism have all seemed to converge on the use of criminal 
law to address sexual inequality). 
 337. See Franke, supra note 8, at 181, 197–98, 206. 
 338. See id. at 182, 199–201. 
 339. See id. at 199. 
 340. See Gruber, supra note 11, at 607, 610. 
 341. See KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER 57–84 (1993); NAOMI WOLF, FIRE WITH FIRE 
192–93 (1994); see also SCHULHOFER, supra note 12, at 261 (discussing a feminist idea that “rape 
law treats women as if they were not adults or free agents”); Gruber, supra note 11, at 608 (arguing 
that “criminal rape law negatively affect[s] female agency”); Kahan, supra note 37, at 741–42 
(noting the legal feminist view that “agitation over date rape was conditioning women to accept 
a disempowered ‘victimhood’ identity”). 
 342. See Gruber, supra note 11, at 608.  
 343. See Vivian Berger, Not So Simple Rape, 7 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 69, 75–76 (1988); Dressler, 
supra note 13, at 414, 428; Kahan, supra note 37, at 741–42. 
 344. See DWORKIN, supra note 324, at 154–82; Cheryl Hanna, Rethinking Consent in a Big 
Love Way, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 111, 136–39 (2010); MacKinnon, supra note 30, at 646–47, 
650, 652; Carole Pateman, Women and Consent, 8 POL. THEORY 149, 158–64 (1980); see also 
Rebecca Traister, Why Consensual Sex Can Still Be Bad, N.Y. MAG. (Oct. 20, 2015), http://
nymag.com/thecut/2015/10/why-consensual-sex-can-still-be-bad.html [https://perma.cc/8L6X-FL
8Z] (discussing the dangers of consensual sex). 
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argue, ignore these constraints on women’s autonomy and simply 
pretend women are as free as men in their sexual choices.345 
Laws must therefore treat women as autonomous while 
simultaneously addressing the gender subordination that undermines 
that autonomy.346 Sex-positive feminism attempts to meet this 
challenge by advocating a positive vision of sex that is capable of 
granting women both pleasure and power.347 It argues that sex need not 
be a de facto hazard for women, but rather can be something women 
choose on their own terms.348 In order for this to occur, though, the law 
must respect both negative and positive sexual autonomy—what Aya 
Gruber calls a “thick view of female autonomy.”349 In addition, the law 
must “reject[] a culture that privileges male [and] heterosexual desire 
and pleasure above female [and] queer desire and pleasure.”350 
This Article does not claim to meet the complex challenge of 
theorizing yes, but it does assert this: we must change the dimensions 
of rape law to have this conversation constructively. Criminal law in 
itself is not equal to the task. Our focus on it thwarts any possibility of 
navigating these tricky waters. 
Criminal law’s focus on punishment and prohibition limits its 
ability to theorize yes. To paraphrase Oliver Wendell Holmes, “the law 
does not exist to tell the good man what to do, but to tell the bad man 
what not to do.”351 Criminal law by nature emphasizes only the hazards 
of sex.352 It cannot theorize what sex should be, only what it is 
prohibited from being. It therefore cannot be the basis of theorizing 
positive models of sex. 
 
 345. See Gruber, supra note 11, at 612; Hanna, supra note 344, at 136–40, 143–45; 
Tuerkheimer, supra note 44, at 340–41. 
 346. See Gruber, supra note 11, at 611; Hanna, supra note 344, at 143–45. Some modern 
feminists employ the idea of constrained autonomy, in which “women must constantly navigate 
the space between idealized autonomous liberality and the oppressive conditions of 
subordination.” Gruber, supra note 11, at 610. 
 347. See Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 12, at 214; Gayle S. Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for 
a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING WOMEN’S 
SEXUALITY 143, 166–67 (Carol S. Vance ed., 1984); Traister, supra note 344. “While there is also 
no one accepted definition for sex positivity, there are guiding principles. A sex-positive 
framework values sexual autonomy and all forms of consensual sexual activities as sources of 
pleasure and fulfillment.” Margo Kaplan, Sex Positive Law, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 95 (2014). 
 348. See Gruber, supra note 11, at 611–12; Traister, supra note 344. 
 349. Gruber, supra note 11, at 608.  
 350. Kaplan, supra note 347, at 95. 
 351. Estrich, supra note 12, at 1091 (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 
HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897)). 
 352. See Gruber, supra note 11, at 611–12. 
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Criminal law also by nature ignores the vast expanse of sex that 
should not be criminal but which nonetheless is problematic. Criminal 
law categorizes sex as either criminal or acceptable.353 But sex is not 
limited to “rape” or “not rape.” Consensual sex, even enthusiastic sex, 
often still exists on a spectrum of sexual interactions tainted by power 
imbalances, poor relationships, bad communication, and lack of 
respect.354 As one commenter writes, 
[T]he game remains rigged. . . . in ways that go well beyond 
consent. . . . Male attention and approval remain the validating metric 
of female worth, and women are still (perhaps increasingly) expected 
to look and fuck like porn stars—plucked, smooth, their pleasure 
performed persuasively. Meanwhile, male climax remains the 
accepted finish of hetero encounters; a woman’s orgasm is still the 
elusive, optional bonus round. . . . [T]his is all part of consensual sex, 
the kind that is supposed to be women’s feminist reward.355  
A student writing for the Harvard Crimson described the 
complicated nature of exercising sexual autonomy in a culture that 
simultaneously judges women on their desirability and dismisses their 
sexual desire. “I don’t say yes. I say oh, yes. I say yes, please. I paper 
his walls with my yeses,”356 she writes. But, she notes, “Saying yes to 
hooking up meant more than just hands on my breasts. It meant 
desirability. It meant acceptance. . . . [Women have] been trained our 
whole lives to associate our worth with our sexualities, so saying yes to 
sex . . . can determine [our] feelings of value.”357 
In a subsequent blog for Feministing.com, the same author writes, 
  A lot of sex feels like . . . . [s]ex where we don’t matter. Where we 
may as well not be there. Sex where we don’t say no, because we don’t 
want to say no, sex where we say yes even, where we’re even into it, 
but where we fear—some little voice in us fears—that if we did say 
 
 353. See Bryden, supra note 30, at 369 (noting that rape law does not prohibit all types of 
harmful sex and tends to legitimate what it does not prohibit). 
 354. See id. at 369–70; Traister, supra note 344. 
 355. Traister, supra note 344 (emphasis in original); see also Baker, What Rape Is, supra note 
17, at 241 (noting that the biological nature of sex leads men to see orgasm as the sole purpose or 
end goal of sex). 
 356. Reina A.E. Gattuso, Do You Think I’m Pretty?, HARV. CRIMSON (Feb. 27, 2015), 
http://www.thecrimson.com/column/material-girl/article/2015/2/27/you-think-im-pretty/ [https://
perma.cc/A34M-AKPS]. 
 357. Id.; see also Traister, supra note 344 (recounting Gattuso’s story). 
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no, if we don’t like the pressure on our necks or the way they touch 
us, it wouldn’t matter. It wouldn’t count, because we don’t count. 
  This feeling isn’t necessarily assault, but it is certainly on a 
continuum with it.358 
Even the most progressive rape law should not criminalize many 
sexual interactions like those described above—those influenced by 
social pressures or lacking in respect, trust, or pleasure. Yet theorizing 
yes must take into account the entire spectrum of sexual interactions 
and not simply where to draw the line of criminalization.359 
Changing the dimensions of rape law will not resolve these issues, 
but it will give the law a richer and more active role in addressing 
them.360 A public health approach can explore the full range of sexual 
attitudes and behaviors, including those that are problematic despite 
being inappropriate for criminalization. It can acknowledge that 
female desire and sexuality is more complicated than distinguishing 
consent from nonconsent, where all consensual sex is good and all 
nonconsensual sex is bad.361 
Just as importantly, a public health approach can emphasize what 
is good about sex, and what good sex looks and feels like for all 
participants.362 As feminist blogger Maya Dusenberry argues, legal 
feminists need “to put forth a positive alternative vision for what sex 
could be and isn’t.”363 Public health provides a framework that can 
 
 358. Reina A.E. Gattuso, Rape Culture Is a Contract We Never Actually Signed, FEMINISTING 
(May 26, 2015), http://feministing.com/2015/05/26/rape-culture-is-a-contract-we-never-actually-
signed [https://perma.cc/H22M-K9DU]; see also Traister, supra note 344 (recounting Gattuso’s 
story). 
 359. See Traister, supra note 344. 
 360. See Filipovic, supra note 85, at 26–27. 
 361. See Heather Corinna, An Immodest Proposal, in YES MEANS YES, supra note 85, at 179, 
183; Traister, supra note 344. 
 362. See Traister, supra note 344. This does not require the world that Franke warns of, in 
which sex must be a “warm, fuzzy, soft-focused cuddling.” Franke, supra note 8, at 206; see also 
MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE ETHICS OF QUEER 
LIFE 3 (1999) (warning of a “sanitized, pastoral picture of sex, as though it were simply joy, light, 
healing, and oneness with the universe”). Sex can encompass many sources of pleasure for people, 
including, for example, casual sex or sex that involves bondage, dominance, submission, and 
sadomasochism. See Kaplan, supra note 347, at 155–56; see also Gattuso, supra note 358 (arguing 
that sex need not always be “some kind of soulful, look-each-other-in-the-eyes, make-sweet-love, 
emotional-intellectual experience”). These are not easy paths to navigate, and this Article does 
not attempt to resolve all debates about what constitutes healthy sexuality. It posits, however, 
that public health law provides a far better framework than criminal law to create laws and 
policies that engage this debate.  
 363. Traister, supra note 344 (quoting Maya Dusenberry). 
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embrace the importance of sexual pleasure and good sexual 
relationships. 
A public health approach provides a legal framework in which to 
further explore feminist conceptions of sexual ideals that do not fit into 
the criminal law model. Martha Chamallas, for example, argues for an 
“ideal of sexual conduct based not just on consent, but on mutuality,”364 
which asks whether the individual would have initiated the encounter 
had she been given the choice.365 While this ideal is likely incompatible 
with criminal law,366 public health provides a promising legal schema. 
Legal feminists might also consider public health laws and policies 
that support what social psychology scholars Michelle Fine and Sara 
McClellan term “thick desire,” a framework that “situates sexual well 
being within structural contexts that enable economic, educational, 
social, and psychological health.”367 Thick desire places sexual desire 
within a broader framework of desire for opportunity, community, 
pleasure, and protection from coercion and danger.368 It requires laws 
and policies that allow women to 
(a) develop intellectually, emotionally, economically, and culturally; 
(b) imagine themselves as sexual beings capable of pleasure and 
cautious about danger without carrying the undue burden of social, 
medical, and reproductive consequences; (c) have access to 
information and health-care resources; (d) be protected from 
structural and intimate violence and abuse; and (e) rely on a public 
safety net of resources to support youth, families, and community.369 
Shifting the paradigm of rape law from criminal law to public 
health provides a framework in which legal feminists can engage 
underlying social, economic, and cultural implications of theorizing 
yes. It allows them, for example, to challenge an educational system 
that has failed to acknowledge and respect female desire even as it 
venerates male desire and aggression,370 to envision laws and policies 
that use mass media to change social norms about healthy sexual 
 
 364. Chamallas, supra note 28, at 836. 
 365. See id. at 835–43. But see Dripps, supra note 13, at 1790 (arguing that Chamallas’s theory 
fails to take the complexity of personal relationships into account). 
 366. See Chamallas, supra note 28, at 836–37.  
 367. Fine & McClelland, supra note 303, at 301. 
 368. See id. at 325–26. 
 369. Id. at 300–01. 
 370. See id. at 297; Michelle Fine, Sexuality, Schooling, and Adolescent Females: The Missing 
Discourse of Desire, 58 HARV. EDUC. REV. 29, 36–37 (1988). 
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attitudes and behaviors, and to explore the social and economic 
policies that support female sexual autonomy in a country where sexual 
violence is linked to poverty and race.371 
E. Potential Criticisms of the Public Health Framework 
One potential objection to a public health framework is that it 
might undermine the criminal law process. Reconceptualizing rape as 
a public health issue with criminal law implications may send the 
message that rape is not a serious crime. Similarly, those unfamiliar 
with the scope of public health law may misunderstand the framework 
as labeling rape a sickness or those who commit it as merely ill and not 
responsible for their actions. This may weaken society’s moral 
condemnation of rape, which is necessary for effective criminal justice. 
In practice, however, a transformation to a public health focus is 
likely to benefit criminal law practice and theory. As Part I.B argues, 
the moral condemnation necessary for effective criminalization is 
already undermined; in the case of acquaintance rape, it is largely 
absent. A public health approach can strengthen criminal law by 
changing the social norms that thwart the effective prosecution of 
sexual violence. Public health interventions can diminish the influence 
of stereotypes and rape myths on jury interpretation of facts and law. 
They will also undermine defendant arguments that they lacked mens 
rea; increasing awareness and changing social norms will make it far 
less credible that a defendant was unaware of nonconsent or that a 
defendant acted reasonably in ignoring or failing to perceive signs of 
nonconsent. 
Another potential objection to this framework is that a public 
health model is simply unsuited to an issue such as rape. Similar 
arguments were made against proposals in the 1990s to address youth 
violence through public health interventions. In an essay published in 
the Yale Law Journal, Children’s Defense Fund attorney Hattie 
Ruttenberg argued that youth violence did not fit neatly into the public 
health model because the latter generally focused on behaviors toward 
pathogens, as opposed to behavior as a pathogen.372 Ruttenberg also 
argued that public health interventions rely primarily on providing 
information that changes an individual’s cost-benefit analysis.373 These 
interventions, she argued, could not prevent youth violence because 
 
 371. See Gruber, supra note 11, at 609–10; supra Parts II.B.3, II.C.4–5. 
 372. See Ruttenberg, supra note 221, at 1887–88. 
 373. See id. at 1903–04. 
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lack of information was not the problem; violent youth were well aware 
of the risks associated with violent behavior.374 She also questioned the 
use of education programs to change attitudes toward violence and 
teach dispute resolution skills, arguing “it is hard to believe that anger-
management skills effectively can counterbalance the real-life 
problems of a child who, for example, is living in poverty, a dangerous 
neighborhood, and an unstable family.”375 
Such critiques underestimate the breadth and depth of public 
health interventions. While public health models do provide 
information to change individuals’ cost-benefit analyses, this is hardly 
their only role. Ruttenberg’s essay gives limited analysis of the role of 
social norms and conventions in individuals’ choices and how 
interventions target these norms to change behaviors. Public health 
interventions can effectively reduce criminal behavior and violence 
among youth, but such interventions must consist of more than a few 
anger management courses.376 
A public health law framework is particularly well suited to solve 
the challenges posed by rape, perhaps more so than those posed by 
youth violence, because of the way that social norms and conventions 
obscure the problem itself. In contrast to youth violence, acquaintance 
rape is not widely accepted as criminal or harmful.377 As discussed 
above, a public health approach is necessary to change the social norms 
that prevent successful prosecution. 
Such critiques correctly note that public health approaches will 
likely be insufficient absent policies that address underlying social 
determinants such as poverty, environment, and family relationships. 
This is less an argument against a public health framework than a 
caution about how to use it. Public health law can and should analyze 
social determinants and design interventions to target them. 
Perhaps the most difficult challenge that a public health law 
framework poses is the significant investment in time and resources 
that it requires. Shifts in social norms and conventions do not occur 
quickly or easily. Public health efforts to change norms surrounding 
behaviors such as smoking or breastfeeding took significant time and 
investment, and these efforts are ongoing. It is also likely that tactics 
will need to change if interventions are proven ineffective. A public 
 
 374. See id. at 1906–10. 
 375. Id. at 1906. 
 376. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 377. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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health law approach that takes seriously its evidence-based prevention 
mandate could take years or decades to demonstrate progress. 
Yet this is also a strength of a public health law framework. Such 
investment is the price of addressing the underlying causes of a 
problem rather than simply punishing the results. The ability to 
abandon a futile course for a more promising one is a hallmark of good 
science and good policy. Rape law should not ignore these hard truths. 
CONCLUSION 
Rape law scholarship has, for the most part, rejected the paradigm 
of the violent stranger and the resistant virgin. This Article pushes legal 
scholarship to reject another outdated paradigm: that rape law is first 
and foremost criminal law. It begins a larger discussion of how a public 
health framework can give the law a broader, deeper, and more 
complex role in preventing and punishing offenses rooted in troubling 
social norms. 
A public health law approach to rape can also provide a model for 
resolving other social issues. Public health approaches are not entirely 
new to criminal law issues, but strategies that seek to replace criminal 
law as the primary approach often focus on “victimless” crimes such as 
drug use and possession.378 This Article differs from many of those 
arguments in that it offers public health law a primary role in the 
prevention of a crime with a clear victim. It does not argue against 
prosecution, but rather in favor of shifting to a public health framework 
that would make prosecution more effective and fair. 
 
 378. See, e.g., Larry Gostin, An Alternative Public Health Vision for a National Drug Strategy: 
“Treatment Works,” 28 HOUS. L. REV. 285, 287–88 (1991). 
